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INTRODUCTION
More than 40 years ago, Ronald Dworkin made the
following observation about Regents of the University of California v.
Bakke,1 the Supreme Court’s first major affirmative action case: “No lawsuit
has ever been more widely watched or more thoroughly debated in the
national and international press.”2 Indeed, according to Howard Ball, “[a]
record fifty-eight amicus briefs were filed after the Court granted certiorari
in Bakke.”3 Signaling what would become a trademark of affirmative action
litigation, the Bakke amicus briefs weighed heavily in the state’s favor,4 and
featured influential professional and academic institutions.5 The Ivy League
schools filed their own amicus brief, defending their use of affirmative action
as essential to their academic goals.6 McGeorge Bundy (the Harvard dean
and Ford Foundation president) wrote a lengthy cover story in the Atlantic
Monthly passionately arguing in favor of affirmative action.7 Before
announcing the Court’s judgment in that case, Justice Lewis F. Powell Jr.
echoed Dworkin’s assessment: “Perhaps no case in modern memory has
received so much media coverage and scholarly commentary.”8
Now the Harvard affirmative action case,9 as it advances through the
federal courts more than 40 years later, might surpass the Bakke case in terms
of media coverage.10 Before the district court even made its decision to
* This Article was presented as part of the Ohio Northern University Pettit College of Law Dean’s Lecture
Series. I would like to thank all of those involved, particularly Dean Rose and Professor Gerber, for the
opportunity to present my research on affirmative action and judicial politics. Associate Professor of
Government, Patrick Henry College; Washington Fellow, The Claremont Institute Center for the
American Way of Life. Ph.D. (Political Science, Johns Hopkins University); M.A. (Philosophy, Johns
Hopkins University); J.D. (The George Washington University Law School); B.A. (Government,
Wesleyan University).
1. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
2. Ronald Dworkin, Why Bakke Has No Case, THE N.Y. REV. (Nov. 10, 1977), https://www.nyb
ooks.com/articles/1977/11/10/why-bakke-has-no-case/?lp_txn_id=1246446.
3. HOWARD BALL, THE BAKKE CASE: RACE, EDUCATION, & AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 77 (2000).
4. According to Ball, 42 of these 58 amicus briefs “supported the petitioner” (i.e., in favor of
affirmative action) while only “sixteen sided with the respondent” (i.e., in opposition to affirmative action).
Id.
5. Id. at 82.
6. See also Anne E. Bartlett, Justice Department Files Bakke Brief, THE HARV. CRIMSON (Sept.
21, 1977), https://www.thecrimson.com/article/1977/9/21/justice-department-files-bakke-brief-pan/.
7. McGeorge Bundy, The Issue Before the Court: Who Gets Ahead in America?, THE ATL., (Nov.
1977), https://web.archive.org/web/20070217075143/http://www.etsu.edu/cas/history/docs/bundy.htm.
8. Anthony Lewis, ‘Bakke’ May Change a Lot While Changing No Law, N.Y. TIMES (July 2,
1978), https://timesmachine.nytimes.com/timesmachine/1978/07/02/issue.html.
9. On February 25, 2021, a petition for writ of certiorari was filed in Students for Fair Admissions
v. Harvard. At the time of my writing, the case is currently pending the Supreme Court’s certiorari
decision.
10. See Vivi E. Lu, Students for Fair Admissions Petitions SCOTUS to Take Up Suit Against
Harvard’s Race-Conscious Admissions, THE HARV. CRIMSON (Feb. 25, 2021), https://www.thecrimson.c
om/article/2021/2/25/sffa-scotus-petition/.
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uphold the program, Natasha Kumar Warikoo, a sociologist at Tufts and a
visiting professor at Harvard, predicted that the Harvard case “could be the
beginning of the end of affirmative action.”11 Washington Post’s Paul
Waldman likewise predicted that the Harvard case will destroy affirmative
action: “it’ll be all over.”12 Even after the district court applied Supreme
Court precedent to rule in favor of Harvard, pundits still predicted that the
case might “end affirmative action.”13 On the American Constitution Society
blog, Vinay Harpalani, a legal scholar specializing in affirmative action law,
predicted that the First Circuit would affirm the District Court decision
(which turned out to be correct),14 but that “a cert grant will likely mean the
end of affirmative action in university admissions.”15
Professor Harpalani’s prediction is almost certainly wrong; even if the
Supreme Court grants certiorari, there is almost no chance that the Harvard
case, regardless of how it is decided by the Supreme Court, will mean the end
of affirmative action in university admissions or in any other area of
American life. The point of this Article is to explain why this is so.
Before we get into the substance of the argument, however, it is important
to appreciate the extent to which this Article goes against the grain of expert
opinion on the future of affirmative action. Indeed, it is not just Professor
Harpalani who has predicted the demise of affirmative action. For over 30
years, leading scholars and pundits, on both the left and right alike, have been
predicting the demise of affirmative action. These predictions have
consistently been wrong.
Consider how, after City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 16
conservative columnist Charles Krauthammer issued the following
prediction about the decision: “Croson marks the beginning of the end of
affirmative action.”17 An article in the peer-reviewed National Black Law
11. Natasha K. Warikoo, Opinion: The False Narrative Driving the Harvard Affirmative Action
Case, PBS (Nov. 2, 2018, 2:17 PM), https://www.pbs.org/newshour/education/opinion-the-false-narrati
ve-driving-the-harvard-affirmative-action-case.
12. Paul Waldman, Opinion: The Case That Will Destroy Affirmative Action in Higher Education,
THE WASH. POST (Oct. 18, 2018, 3:08 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/plum-lin
e/wp/2018/10/18/the-case-that-will-destroy-affirmative-action-in-higher-education/.
13. Alexia Fernández Campbell & P.R. Lockhart, The Harvard Admissions Case That Could End
Affirmative Action, Explained, VOX (Oct. 2, 2019, 2:50 PM), https://www.vox.com/identities/2019/10/2/
20894934/harvard-admissions-case-affirmative-action.
14. Vinay Harpalani, The Supreme Court and the Future of Affirmative Action, AM. CONST. SOC’Y
(Oct. 28, 2019), https://www.acslaw.org/expertforum/the-supreme-court-and-the-future-of-affir mativeaction/; Harvard, 980 F.3d at 203-04.
15. Id.
16. 488 U.S. 469, 511 (1989) (holding that a government contract set-aside plan violated the Equal
Protection Clause).
17. Charles Krauthammer, Exit Affirmative Action, WASH. POST (Feb. 3, 1989), https://www.was
hingtonpost.com/archive/opinions/1989/02/03/exit-affirmative-action/86cbc246-f37b-4c50-b09f-b0a764
e593c0/.

Published by DigitalCommons@ONU,

3

Ohio Northern University Law Review, Vol. 48 [], Iss. 1, Art. 4

98

OHIO NORTHERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 48

Journal likewise declared that Croson represented the “sunset of affirmative
action.” 18 After the appointment of Justice Clarence Thomas in 1991,
these predictions became even bolder. 19 For example, in 1992, George
A. Rutherglen, writing in the Illinois Law Review, predicted that “[a]n
increasingly conservative Court is likely to limit affirmative action to
progressively narrower circumstances, and perhaps, to prohibit it entirely.”20
Professor Carl Livingston likewise argued that “[t]he Court’s affirmative
action jurisprudence has shifted dramatically to the conservative right since
1978 . . . towards the dismantling of affirmative action.”21
After the Croson decision failed to put an end to affirmative action,
pundits and scholars simply shifted their predictions to Adarand
Constructors, Inc. v. Peña. 22 Shortly after the Adarand oral argument,
Newsweek featured a staff article entitled “the end of affirmative action.”23
After the Supreme Court held in Adarand that affirmative action
programs must be subject to strict scrutiny, many scholars assumed
affirmative action had effectively been forbidden, to the point that
Darien McWhirter wrote an entire book on the premise that Adarand had
killed affirmative action for good; the only question for McWhirter was what
kind of civil rights policies should be adopted in its place.24
Scholars made similar predictions about the Fifth Circuit’s decision in
Hopwood v. Texas.25 After the lawsuit was filed, and before the Fifth
Circuit’s decision was issued, Jeffrey Rosen claimed in a New Republic
article that affirmative action “law was unraveling” and that affirmative
action may be “doomed” by the stark racial preferences revealed in the
Hopwood litigation.26 Rosen was right that the Fifth Circuit would
invalidate the program, but he was wrong to infer “doom” from the
case; the decision ended up having limited impact, partly because the
Supreme Court refused to hear the case. 27 Nevertheless, even after the
Supreme Court denied certiorari in Hopwood, scholars continued to
18. Cristopher H. Davis & Darrell D. Jackson, The Sunset of Affirmative Action: City of Richmond
v. J.A. Croson Co., 12 NAT’L BLACK L. J. 73 (1990).
19. George A. Rutherglen, After Affirmative Action: Conditions and Consequences of Ending
Preferences in Employment, 1992 U. ILL. L. REV. 339, 340 (1992).
20. Id.
21. Carl L. Livingston, Affirmative Action on Trial: The Retraction of Affirmative Action and the
Case for its Retention, 40 HOW. L.J. 145, 162 (1996).
22. 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
23. The End of Affirmative Action, NEWSWEEK, 12 Feb. 1995.
24. D ARIEN M C W HIRTER , THE END OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION: WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE?
(1996).
25. 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996).
26. Jeffrey Rosen, Is Affirmative Action Doomed?, THE NEW REPUBLIC (Oct. 17, 1994),
https://newrepublic.com/article/73772/affirmative-action-doomed
27. Texas v. Hopwood, 518 U.S. 1033 (1996) (cert. denied).
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see the case as spelling “the end of affirmative action in higher
education.”28 Michelle Adams wrote in 1998 that Croson and Adarand had
already “dismantled preferential forms of affirmative action,”29 and Hopwood
was simply the nail in the coffin, signaling “the last wave of affirmative
action.”30 This was the general sentiment among scholars at the conclusion
of the 20th century—for example, Michael Selmi lamented in a 1999 law
review article that “we find ourselves in the midst of an extensive dismantling
of the affirmative action infrastructure, one that may foreshadow the end of
affirmative action.”31
A few years later, the Michigan cases—Gratz v. Bollinger32 and Grutter
v. Bollinger33 —incited a new flurry of autopsies. This time, the scholars and
pundits assured, affirmative action was going to die.34 Indeed, Ronald
Dworkin predicted that the Michigan cases “might well mean the end of
effective affirmative action programs in American colleges and
universities.”35 The conservative writer Charles Krauthammer likewise
predicted, just as he had 14 years earlier, that “the day now seems at hand . .
. for the abolition of affirmative action.”36 But yet again, that is not what
happened.37 The Supreme Court invalidated the University of Michigan
undergraduate policy,38 but upheld the law school program, albeit with Justice
O’Connor’s own prediction that affirmative action would die within the next
25 years.39
The Grutter decision, however, did not deter scholars and pundits from
continuing to offer dire diagnoses on the state of affirmative action.40 Six
years later, in Ricci v. DeStefano,41 the Supreme Court invalidated New
Haven’s application of Title VII’s “disparate impact” analysis in its fire
department promotions, and this prompted pundits to say that the Supreme
Court had killed affirmative action.42 Juan Williams, writing for the
28. Charles R. Lawrence III, Each Other’s Harvest: Diversity’s Deeper Meaning, 31 U.S.F. L.
REV. 757, 763 (1997).
29. Michelle Adams, The Last Wave of Affirmative Action, 1998 WIS. L. REV. 1395, 1397 (1998).
30. Id.
31. Michael Selmi, The Facts of Affirmative Action, 85 VA. L. REV. 697, 698 (1999).
32. 539 U.S. 244 (2003).
33. 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
34. Ronald Dworkin, The Court and the University, THE N.Y. REV. (May 15, 2003),
https://www.nybooks.com/articles/2003/05/15/the-court-and-the-university/.
35. Id.
36. Charles Krauthammer, How Not to Abolish Affirmative Action, WASH. EXAM’R (Feb. 10,
2003), https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/weekly-standard/how-not-to-abolish-affirmative-action.
37. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 343.
38. Gratz, 539 U.S. at 275-76.
39. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 343.
40. Juan Williams, Affirmative Action Died Too Soon, WASH. POST (July 26, 2009),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/07/24/AR2009072402101.html.
41. 557 U.S. 557, 593 (2009).
42. Id. at 592.
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Washington Post, declared that “[a]ffirmative action, age 45, is dead.”43
Ward Connerly, a conservative activist and ardent affirmative action critic,
issued a similarly dire diagnosis: “the Ricci decision suggests that we are
witnessing the beginning of the end of affirmative action preferences.”44
In 2013, a few years after Ricci, the Court decided to hear yet another
case out of the University of Texas system, Fisher v. University of Texas,45
and as expected, more predictions of death followed. When the Supreme
Court decided to hear the case, Sam Fulwood of the Center for American
Progress proclaimed that “[f]or all intents and purposes, affirmative action is
dead.”46 Likewise, after the Court decided to rehear the case after sending it
back to the Fifth Circuit, “legal experts thought that the decision [to rehear
the case] signaled the end of affirmative action.”47 Indeed, Professor Herbert
C. Brown Jr. observed that experts widely believed that Fisher II would bring
“the dreaded end of affirmative action.”48 Similarly, Eric Levitz wrote the
following about Fisher II: “The Supreme Court will very likely end
affirmative action at UT Austin, and may even end affirmative action at all
public universities.”49 Dan Solomon at Texas Monthly wrote that Fisher II
“is a major case that could mean the end of affirmative action across the
country.”50 But that, yet again, is not what happened. The Fisher II decision,
while reciting the Court’s previous condemnations of affirmative action,
upheld the University of Texas program by creating a new approach to strict
scrutiny, one significantly more deferential to government discretion and
applicable only to affirmative action law.51
In 2014, in between Fisher I and Fisher II, the Supreme Court decided
another affirmative action case, Schuette v. Coalition to Defend Affirmative
43. Williams, supra note 40.
44. Ward Connerly, Ricci and the Future of Race in America, THE CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (July
14, 2009), https://www.csmonitor.com/Commentary/Opinion/2009/0714/p09s01-coop.html
45. 570 U.S. 297, 303 (2013).
46. Sam Fulwood III, The Death of Affirmative Action, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (Apr. 3, 2012,
9:00 AM), https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/race/news/2012/04/03/11368/race-and-beyond-thedeath-of-affirmative-action/.
47. Hugh Barrett McClean, The Diversity Rationale for Affirmative Action In Military Contracting,
66 CATHOLIC UNIV. L. REV. 745, 771 (2017), https://scholarworks.law.ubalt.edu/cgi/viewc
ontent.cgi?article=2066&context=all_fac.
48. Herbert C. Brown, Jr., A Crowded Room or the Perfect Fit? Exploring Affirmative Action
Treatment in College and University Admissions for Self-Identified LGBT Individuals, 3 WM. & MARY J.
OF WOMEN AND THE L. 603, 630 (2015), https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=14
09&context=wmjowl.
49. Eric Levitz, The Supreme Court May Be on the Verge of Ending Affirmative Action, MSNBC
(June 29, 2015, 6:50 PM), https://www.msnbc.com/msnbc/the-supreme-court-may-be-the-verge-endingaffirmative-action-msna628811.
50. Dan Solomon, What Antonin Scalia’s Empty Spot Means for Texas-Based Supreme Court
Cases, TEX. MONTHLY (Feb. 16, 2016), https://www.texasmonthly.com/the-daily-post/what-antoninscalia-retirement-means-for-hb2-and-abigail-fisher-vs-ut/.
51. Fisher v. University of Texas, 136 S.Ct. 2198, 2214 (2016).
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Action,52 involving a constitutional challenge to Michigan’s state ban on
affirmative action. This case brought the same predictions. When the
Schuette case was in the lower court, the right-leaning Weekly Standard
celebrated “the end of affirmative action.”53 After the Supreme Court upheld
the Michigan ban, Victor Davis Hanson, in the National Review, wrote a
nearly identical article, with the same title, “The End of Affirmative
Action.”54 And yet affirmative action has continued not only to exist but to
thrive.
That hasn’t stopped scholars from predicting the demise of affirmative
action. In a 2018 UC Davis Law symposium on the 40-year legacy of the
Bakke decision,55 Yuvraj Joshi wrote that “Justice Kennedy’s retirement
spells the end of affirmative action as we know it.”56 Professor Kermit
Roosevelt of Penn Law similarly predicted “that affirmative action’s fate was
sealed with Judge Brett Kavanaugh’s nomination.”57 A prominent education
publication summarized the expert opinion on the subject as follows:
“Scholars believe Supreme Court likely to end affirmative action with
Kavanaugh.”58 The same predictions followed Justice Ginsburg’s death.
David S. Cohen claimed that if former President Trump nominated Justice
Ginsburg’s successor, “[t]here would be a sixth vote against affirmative
action.”59 And when former President Trump did just that by nominating
Amy Coney Barrett, experts predicted that she would vote against Harvard if
the case got to the Supreme Court.60 Conservatives, meanwhile, rejoiced that
Justice Barrett’s confirmation represents the end of affirmative action.61

52. 572 U.S. 291 (2014).
53. Kevin Mooney, The End of Affirmative Action, WASH. EXAM’R (Oct. 10, 2011, 1:00 PM),
https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/weekly-standard/the-end-of-affirmative-action.
54. Victor Davis Hanson, The End of Affirmative Action, NAT’L REV. (May 1, 2014, 4:00 AM),
https://www.nationalreview.com/2014/05/end-affirmative-action-victor-davis-hanson/.
55. Bakke at 40: Diversity, Difference, and Doctrine, 52 UC DAVIS L. REV. (Oct. 26, 2018),
https://lawreview.law.ucdavis.edu/symposia/2018-fall/.
56. Yuvraj Joshi, Racial Indirection, 52 UC DAVIS L. REV. 2495, 2497 (2019),
https://lawreview.law.ucdavis.edu/issues/52/5/Symposium/52-5_Joshi.pdf.
57. Seth Schuster, Kavanaugh’s Confirmation May Spell the End of Affirmative Action at Penn
and Elsewhere, THE DAILY PENNSYLVANIAN (Oct. 7, 2018, 11:57 PM), https://www.thedp.com/article/20
18/10/brett-kavanaugh-upenn-asian-admissions-policies-eric-furda-philadelphia.
58. Monica Levitan & LaMont Jones, Scholars Believe Supreme Court Likely to End Affirmative
Action with Kavanaugh, DIVERSE EDUC. (Sept. 13, 2018), https://diverseeducation.com/article/126121/.
59. David S. Cohen, What the Loss of Ruth Bader Ginsburg Means for the Supreme Court,
ROLLING STONE (Sept. 18, 2020, 10:03 PM), https://www.rollingstone.com/politics/political-commentary
/ruth-bader-ginsburg-scotus-trump-justice-appointment-1063402/.
60. Benjamin L. Fu & Dohyun Kim, Experts Say SCOTUS Nomination Threatens Harvard
Admissions Lawsuit Ruling, THE HARV. CRIMSON (Sept. 29, 2020), https://www.thecrimson.com/article/2
020/9/29/barrett-nomination-admissions-lawsuit/.
61. Jason L. Riley, With Justice Barrett, Is the End Near for Racial Preferences?, WSJ (Oct. 27,
2020, 7:05 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/with-justice-barrett-is-the-end-near-for-racial-preferences11603839923.
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Just as none of the Supreme Court’s decisions have had the effect of
eliminating or even limiting affirmative action, the same will likely be the
case with President Trump’s recent Supreme Court appointments. They will
almost certainly have little if any effect on the future of affirmative action.
The point of this Article is to explain why.
More particularly, this Article will seek to explain why, despite the fact
that the Supreme Court has invalidated the vast majority of the affirmative
action programs it has adjudicated,62 despite the fact that 9 states have banned
affirmative action altogether,63 and despite the fact that the Republican Party
has controlled the Supreme Court for more than 50 years due to Republican
Presidents nominating 16 of the last 20 Justices,64 affirmative action has not
only survived over the last two generations but it has broadened and
strengthened in the face of this judicial, legislative, and popular resistance.
There is no other program in the country’s history that has these
characteristics. To appreciate its uniqueness, we must first appreciate that
affirmative action is not a static program; rather it has changed significantly
over time.65 Indeed, affirmative action has existed in American law for over
75 years, but the programs have changed substantially over this period. This
Article will highlight these changes by tracing the development of affirmative
action, separating the program into four discrete phases.66 This analysis will
illustrate how each phase served a critical role in sustaining affirmative action
by facilitating its adaptation to the time period’s political and legal
pressures.67
The Article will break down according to these four phases. Part I will
explore what affirmative action looked like in the generation before the civil
rights movement.68 Part II will cover affirmative action’s second phase,
62. Margaret Kramer, A Timeline of Key Supreme Court Cases on Affirmative Action, The N.Y.
Times (Mar. 30, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/30/us/affirmative-action-supreme-court.html.
63. “Since 1996, nine states have voted to ban the use of affirmative action in college admission:
California (1996), Texas (1996), Washington (1998), Florida (1999), Michigan (2006), Nebraska (2008),
Arizona (2010), New Hampshire (2012), and Oklahoma (2012).” Jenna A. Robinston, Did You Know?
Eight States Ban Affirmative Action in College Admissions (Oct. 24, 2019), https://www.jamesgmartin.ce
nter/2019/10/did-you-know-eight-states-ban-affirmative-action-in-college-admissions/.
64. Supreme Court Nominations (1789-Present), U.S. S., https://www.senate.gov/legislative/nomi
nations/SupremeCourtNominations1789present.htm.
65. For purposes of this Article, affirmative action refers to any program that (1) prefers
historically disadvantaged groups in the provision of employment, educational, or related professional
benefits, and (2) provides this preference for the purpose of either redressing past discrimination or
creating future economic or social equality. Accordingly, the preference of white gentiles over Jewish
applicants, a preference practiced by many elite colleges and universities in the early 20th century, will
not be treated as affirmative action, because this preference favored a majority group that was not in any
sense historically disadvantaged, and moreoever, the preference was not designed to redress past
discrimination or to create future economic equality.
66. See infra Parts I-IV.
67. Id.
68. See infra Part I.
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which arose in the 1960s, in concert with the rise of the civil rights
movement.69 Part III will discuss how a third phase began when Richard
Nixon enacted the Philadelphia Plan, thus extending affirmative action
beyond the Kennedy and Johnson administrations and signaling that
affirmative action had transitioned into a long-term policy associated with
both parties.70 The Supreme Court affirmed this transition shortly after, in
Griggs v. Duke Power,71 when the Supreme Court interpreted “disparate
impact” analysis (a tool for affirmative action) as being part and parcel of
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act.72 Part IV will explain how the Court’s
decision in Bakke v. UC Davis73 marked the beginning of a fourth period,
what I have characterized as the diversity phase.74
The Article Conclusion will begin by considering whether we are in the
process of shifting toward a fifth phase, one in which affirmative action is
now beyond the law because the government’s interest in ideational diversity
for its epistemological value has transitioned into a governmental command
to pursue racial diversity for its categorical moral value. After considering
the possibility that American law is entering a fifth affirmative action phase,
the Article will consider the descriptive and normative implications arising
from this development—namely what it teaches us about American law and
politics that, over a roughly 75-year period, affirmative action has managed
to strengthen and broaden outside the sanction of public opinion, the federal
judiciary, and state law.75 The upshot of this analysis is that, whatever
happens in the Harvard case, affirmative action is here to stay.
I.
PHASE ONE: AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AS AN ANTI-DISCRIMINATION
ENFORCEMENT TOOL
During the 1940s and 1950s, the federal and state governments began
adopting anti-discrimination requirements in various areas of government
employment. Although Presidents Franklin D. Roosevelt, Harry S. Truman,
and Dwight D. Eisenhower did not explicitly adopt affirmative action
programs, they informally employed affirmative action by using statistical
underrepresentation of blacks in various areas of employment as evidence of
discrimination against blacks, thereby providing the basis for governmental
intervention even when there was no actual evidence of discrimination.76
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.

See infra Part II.
See infra Part III.
401 U.S. 424 (1971).
Id. at 432-33.
438 U.S. at 265.
See infra Part IV.
See infra Conclusion.
JOHN DAVID SKRENTNY, THE IRONIES OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION: POLITICS, CULTURE, AND
JUSTICE IN AMERICA 113-15 (1996).

Published by DigitalCommons@ONU,

9

Ohio Northern University Law Review, Vol. 48 [], Iss. 1, Art. 4

104

OHIO NORTHERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 48

These were, as John Skrentny writes, color-blind or classically liberal
programs administered with affirmative action measures.77 That is, during
this period, there were no formal pronouncements concerning preferences for
certain racial groups over others.78 But with the rise of the first round of nondiscrimination measures came enforcement mechanisms that looked a lot like
formal affirmative action.79 In Skrentny’s words, “agencies in search of a
useful tool for fighting discrimination were continually led to the affirmative
action approach”—i.e., they were led to “monitoring numbers and
percentages of African-Americans hired as a measure of discrimination.”80
Skrentny thus argues that affirmative action in America developed gradually,
across administrations and party lines, and long “before the development of
the civil rights movement, before the racial crisis in the cities, before the rise
of militant black groups and theories of compensatory preferences.”81 Below,
I will draw from different sections of Skrentny’s analysis and other scholarly
works in providing a brief overview of how Phase 1 affirmative action
operated. This section will focus on how Phase 1 affirmative action was
characterized by affirmative action solutions to anti-discrimination norms,
thereby laying the foundation for Phase 2 affirmative action, the formal
programs adopted during the civil rights movement.
The term “affirmative action” first appeared in federal law as part of the
National Labor Relations Act of 1935 (“the Wagner Act”),82 which required
employers engaging in unfair labor practices to take “affirmative action” in
correcting such practices.83 The Wagner Act was only a labor law, not a “civil
rights” or “affirmative action” law the way that we currently use those
terms.84 But the Wagner Act inspired New York State to pass the Fair
Employment Practices Act (“Ives-Quinn Act”),85 which used nearly identical
language as the Wagner Act but also included language on racial
discrimination.86 This was the first state ban on racial discrimination in
employment.87
There was significant opposition to the Ives-Quinn Act on the ground that
it would lead to affirmative action, what was described by one of the

77. Id.
78. Id. at 113.
79. Id. at 115.
80. Id.
81. SKRENTNY, supra note 76, at 117.
82. 29 U.S.C.A. § 160(c) (1935).
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. N.Y. Exec. Law § 296.
86. Id.
87. New York Leads the Way, N.Y. STATE, https://empirestateplaza.ny.gov/people-new-york/newyork-leads-way.
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opponents of the legislation as “the Hitlerian rule of [racial] quotas.”88 This
concern was dismissed on the ground that the Act would “not compel an
employer to employ quotas or to employ less efficient persons because of
race, creed, color, or religion, but it specifically prohibits discrimination
solely on these grounds.”89 The critics turned out to be right.90 Within a few
years of the law’s enactment, the New York Commission Against
Discrimination, the agency charged with enforcing the Act, interpreted the
law as requiring what we would describe as affirmative action – i.e., racebased preferences in the hiring process.91 The New York law prompted other
states to adopt similar enactments, creating affirmative action schemes across
the nation.92
The first such federal measure was President Roosevelt’s Executive
Order 8802, which prohibited racial discrimination in the defense industry.93
As Skrentny recounts, the Fair Employment Practice Committee (“FEPC”),
the six-person committee charged with enforcing the order, was “most
concerned not necessarily with stopping discriminatory intent, but with
getting ‘results.’”94 In fact, David Sarnoff, a member of the FEPC committee,
even suggested that government, management, and labor should not feel
obligated to comply with the anti-discrimination text of Executive Order
8802.95 Instead, Sarnoff claimed, those subject to the executive order should
be more inspired by its goal to achieve greater racial proportionality.96 And
Sarnoff urged the use of “ingenuity” in seeking to satisfy this goal.97 This
idea of using ingenuity to achieve a vague goal of proportionate
representation would become, Skrentny writes, “a familiar pattern”
throughout the 1940s and 1950s—i.e., the pattern of “[a] civil rights
administrator demanding a demonstrable, result-oriented implementation,

88. Anthony S. Chen, “The Hitlerian Rule of Quotas”: Racial Conservatism and the Politics of
Fair Employment Legislation in New York State, 1941-1945, 92 J. OF AM. HIST. 1238 (2006).
89. Id. at 1258.
90. Morroe Berger, New York State Law Against Discrimination Operation and Administration,
35 CORNELL L. REV. 747, 769 (1950).
91. See id. (documenting how the newly created New York Commission Against Discrimination
enforced the Act to increase the hiring of African Americans even when there was no actual evidence of
discrimination).
92. For information on how the New York law influenced other states, see Anthony S. Chen, The
Passage of Fair State Employment Legislation, 1945-1964: An Event-History Analysis with Time-Varying
and Time-Constant Covariates, 79 INST. FOR RES. ON LAB. AND EMP. 1, 6-7 (2001),
https://www.irle.berkeley.edu/files/2001/The-Passage-of-State-Fair-Employment-Legislation-19451964.pdf.
93. Exec. Order No. 8802, 6 Fed. Reg. 3,109 (June 25, 1941).
94. SKRENTNY, supra note 76, at 115.
95. Id.; Exec. Order No. 8802.
96. SKRENTNY, supra note 76, at 115.
97. Id. (1996) (quoting LOUIS RUCHAMES, RACE, JOBS, & POLITICS: THE STORY OF FEPC 39-40
(1953)).
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though hedging the issue of how this could be legally be done” under the
governing anti-discrimination law.98
Indeed, we see this pattern appear again in the enforcement of President
Truman’s Executive Order 9980, which ordered the “desegregation of the
federal workforce.”99 Similar to FDR’s Executive Order 8802, Truman’s
Executive Order 9980 created an agency, the Fair Employment Board
(“FEB”), to enforce it.100 And like FDR’s FEPC, the Truman’s FEB quickly
turned into an affirmative action program.
From the start, the FEB Chairman, James L. Houghteling, pushed for the
executive order to serve as a remedy for black underrepresentation, not
simply as a remedy for racial discrimination.101 For example, in a report on
the FEB’s first year (covering from October 1, 1950 to September 30, 1951),
Houghteling explained that the Board should focus on the “persistent
assembly and analysis of the facts, statistical and other, which will determine
with some exactness whether, where, and to what extent discrimination is
practiced, and how, and by whom.”102 This proactive approach, Houghteling
argued, was preferable to the passive approach of simply responding to
complaints of discrimination, for such a passive post hoc approach would, in
Houghteling’s words, “be tantamount to nullification of the most important
and progressive steps contemplated by the Executive Order.”103 In
Houghteling’s view, treating the Executive Order as being limited to its text
(as a mere ban on racial discrimination in federal employment) would nullify
the underlying purpose of the order (which he interpreted as having the goal
of increasing black representation in the federal workforce).104 This approach
was again on display in Houghteling’s letter “to President Truman’s
administrative assistant Donald S. Dawson,” explaining how the Board, to
enforce Executive Order 9980, would have to collect data concerning the
ratios of black employment in various areas of the federal government.105
In 1951, President Truman issued Executive Order 10308, creating the
eleven-person Committee on Government Contract Compliance, charged
with investigating discrimination by government contractors.106 Two years
later, President Eisenhower issued Executive Order 10749, which created the
98. Id.
99. Exec. Order No. 9980, 13 Fed. Reg. 4,311 (July 26, 1948).
100. Id.
101. SKRENTNY, supra note 76, at 115.
102. Id. at 116 (1996) (quoting Report from the Fair Employment Board to the Civil Service
Commission, in Employment of Blacks by the Federal Government, in 4 CIVIL RIGHTS, THE WHITE
HOUSE, AND THE JUSTICE DEPARTMENT: 1945-1968 88 (Michal R. Belknap ed., 1991) (1996)).
103. Id. at 117 (quoting Report from the Fair Employment Board to the Civil Service Commission,
in Employment of Blacks by the Federal Government, in Belknap, supra note 102, at 90).
104. Id. at 115-16.
105. SKRENTNY, supra note 76, at 115-16.
106. Exec. Order No. 10308, 16 Fed. Reg. 12,303 (Dec. 3, 1951).
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fifteen-person President’s Committee on Government Contracts, headed by
Vice President Richard M. Nixon.107 Although this committee had limited
authority, Nixon’s role in the Committee may have had a significant impact
on the trajectory of affirmative action, as nearly 20 years later, Nixon would
become a critical figure in creating Phase 3, a period that entrenched
affirmative action in American law and politics.108 But before Nixon
entrenched affirmative action, it would expand significantly with the rise of
the civil rights movement, beginning with the Supreme Court’s decision in
Brown v. Board of Education.109
II.

PHASE TWO: AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AS A CIVIL RIGHT

During the civil rights movement, a period covering from 1954 to
1968,110 affirmative action changed in three important ways. One, affirmative
action transitioned from providing racial preferences only as a means of
enforcing non-discrimination requirements, to providing racial preferences in
form, as part of the non-discrimination requirements themselves. Two,
affirmative action broadened to apply beyond public employment, as private
companies and universities began to engage in large-scale affirmative action
experiments. Finally, affirmative action began to take on a more
transformative function.
Whereas Phase 1 affirmative action was
characterized by governmental administrators using race-conscious tools
(such as the collection of employment data) for the specific and targeted
purpose of redressing the problem of underrepresentation among African
Americans in particular industries, Phase 2 affirmative action was
characterized by the government’s use of racial preferences as a prospective
tool for reforming society on a larger scale. This suggested that affirmative
action requirements might not be satisfied by a one-time preference in
employment hiring or university admissions decisions; rather, affirmative
action might require a wholesale reformation of how businesses and
universities operated. As a result, any test or practice that obstructed the path
to proportionate equality would become subject to closer scrutiny.
A. Affirmative Action Under the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations
President Kennedy’s Executive Order 10925, issued shortly after
assuming office, represented the first federal reference to “affirmative action”
107. Exec. Order No. 10749, 23 Fed. Reg. 427 (Jan. 21, 1958).
108. Dean J. Kotlowski, Nixon and the Origins of Affirmative Action, 60 THE HISTORIAN 523
(1998).
109. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
110. Historians generally chronicle the movement as beginning with the 1954 Brown decision and
ending in 1968 with the passage of the Fair Housing Act, the last piece of significant civil rights legislation
passed under President Johnson.
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in a racial context.111 On its face, the order was much like previous nondiscrimination orders in that it simply required government contractors to
“take affirmative action to ensure that applicants are employed and that
employees are treated during employment without regard to their race, creed,
color, or national origin.”112 But whereas the earlier non-discrimination
orders took on an affirmative action application through the agencies
responsible for enforcing them, President Kennedy made clear from the start
that his order would require more aggressive actions.113 For example, in a
July 1961 press release, a few months after issuing Executive Order 10925,
President Kennedy claimed that the Committee on Equal Employment
Opportunity, the agency charged with enforcing the order, had conducted a
survey of black employment, and this survey pointed to “where work is
particularly needed to assure equal employment opportunity.”114 In that press
release, Kennedy predicted that increased black employment would be
reflected in the subsequent year’s survey, suggesting that some sort of quota
would be in place.115 Further evidence of Kennedy’s tacit approval of quotas
has been noted by Kennedy’s personal adviser, Arthur Schlesinger Jr., who,
in his biography of Kennedy, observed that Kennedy explicitly sought for
every government department to make “a special effort to seek Negroes for
high federal jobs” and “to recruit Negroes.”116
Just as Kennedy was strengthening affirmative action in federal
employment, he was expanding it into the private sector.117 In July 1961,
Kennedy created the Plans for Progress Program, a voluntary association of
large companies that received exemptions from the Committee on Equal
Employment Opportunity for complying with the Program’s race-based
goals.118 Kennedy made his friend, Robert Troutman, Jr., the director of the
program, and Troutman’s 1962 resignation letter suggests that the Program
operated through quotas.119 As Troutman explained, his job as director had

111. Exec. Order No. 10925, 26 Fed. Reg. 1,977 (Mar. 6, 1961).
112. Id.
113. SKRENTNY, supra note 76 at 117; ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., A THOUSAND DAYS: JOHN
F. KENNEDY IN THE WHITE HOUSE 931-32 (2002).
114. SKRENTNY, supra note 76, at 117 (quoting Report from the Fair Employment Board to the Civil
Service Commission, in Employment of Blacks by the Federal Government, in Belknap, supra note 102,
at 90).
115. Id.
116. SCHLESINGER, JR., supra note 113, at 932-33.
117. SKRENTNY, supra note 76, at 118.
118. Id.
119. Id.
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been to create “a series of one-year goals”120 so that blacks could “enjoy a
respectable portion of the nation’s better jobs.”121
While scholars have used this evidence to argue that Kennedy implicitly
supported the use of racial quotas, it is important to note that he never
explicitly approved of them.122 But whatever Kennedy’s particular
intentions, it was unmistakable that affirmative action—i.e., some sort of
preference in employment on the basis of race—was starting to become part
of what non-discrimination law meant. It was no longer simply a tool that an
agency might use to enforce a non-discrimination requirement.
Just as President Kennedy was far from clear on what kind of racial
preferences would be required by these programs, so was the Civil Rights Act
of 1964, the landmark civil rights legislation banning racial discrimination in
many areas of public and private life.123 It is true that opponents of the
legislation expressed concern that Title VII of the Act (banning various forms
of discrimination in private employment) would give the federal government
the authority to mandate race-based hiring whenever it found a “lack of racial
balance.”124 But it was far from clear at the time that Title VII would be
interpreted to require this, and in fact, there were assurances in the floor
debate that this is not what the legislation would require.125 Nevertheless, the
legislation certainly anticipated that the threat of lawsuits would have the
effect of inducing voluntarily initiated affirmative action programs. As
Christopher Caldwell writes, “[o]ne way to shelter one’s business from the
government’s investigative zeal was to act in the spirit of voluntarism—to
establish pre-emptively a government-approved affirmative action program,
along lines laid out in Section 718 of the act.”126
This “voluntarism” came to look more like governmental regulation just
one year after the Civil Rights Act was passed, when President Johnson
issued Executive Order 11246, requiring government contractors to adopt
affirmative action programs.127 Johnson’s order was similar to the Roosevelt,
120. Id.
121. Id. at 118 (quoting Press Release on Resignation of Robert Troutman and His Attached Final
Report on Plans for Progress (Aug. 20, 1962) in Equal Employment Opportunity, in 5 CIVIL RIGHTS, THE
WHITE HOUSE, AND THE JUSTICE DEPARTMENT: 1945-1968 119 (Michal Belknap ed., 1991)).
122. SKRENTNY, supra note 76, AT 118.
123. See generally Civil Rights Act of 1964 §706(g), 88 Pub. L. 352, 78 Stat. 241.
124. H.R. Rep. No. 914 (1964), reprinted in 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2391, 2436.
125. See, e.g., 110 Cong. Rec. 1518 (Jan. 31, 1964) (statement of Rep. Willis).
126. CHRISTOPHER CALDWELL, AGE OF ENTITLEMENT: AMERICA SINCE THE SIXTIES 32 (2020);
§706(g), 78 Stat. at 241.
127. See Exec. Order 11246 §202(1), 30 Fed. Reg. 12923 (Sept. 24, 1965) (The relevant language
is as follows: “The contractor will take affirmative action to ensure that applicants are employed, and that
employees are treated during employment, without regard to their race, creed, color, or national origin.
Such action shall include, but not be limited to the following: employment, upgrading, demotion, or
transfer; recruitment or recruitment advertising; layoff or termination; rates of pay or other forms of
compensation; and selection for training, including apprenticeship.”).
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Truman, Eisenhower, and Kennedy orders, but, as Skrentny observes, it was
different in one important respect: Johnson’s order created a power
specifically located in “the OFCC, in the Department of Labor, rather than in
some in some free-floating presidential committee, like the earlier
PCEEO.”128 This shift held the potential for the federal government playing
a more transformative role in regulating race and employment.
Johnson’s mandate, however, hinged on a rather uncertain term: What
would it mean for the OFCC to enforce “affirmative action” compliance?129
In January 1967, Edward Sylvester, Director of OFCC, issued a statement
acknowledging that he did not have a clear understanding of what
“affirmative action” entailed.130 According to Director Sylvester, the term
was sufficiently capacious to have different meanings in different contexts.131
The bottom-line for Director Sylvester was, whatever the actual meaning of
the term, the program had to produce results.132 While “this does not
necessarily include preferential treatment” on the basis of race, Sylvester
strongly suggested that racial preferences would be warranted if that is what
was required to increase black employment.133 In Sylvester’s words,
“affirmative action is anything that you have to do to get results.”134
The OFCC’s first major affirmative action program reflected Sylvester’s
openness toward racial quotas.135 This program involved “special area plans”
for construction contracts in four cities: St. Louis (January 1966), San
Francisco (December 1966), Cleveland (February 1967), and Philadelphia
(November 1967).136 The final contract, what came to be known as the
Philadelphia Plan, proved the most controversial.137 OFCC, working with the
Federal Executive Board,138 created a numbers-based model for hiring
minority workers on the basis of “the construction workforce, sources of
minority recruitment, and racial population ratios.”139 These were not racial
quotas but rather “suggested ranges.”140 Using ranges, as opposed to rigid
quotas, was viewed by the Federal Executive Board as a strength of the
128. SKRENTNY, supra note 76, at 134.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 135.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. SKRENTNY, supra note 76, at 135 (referencing Richard P. Nathan, Jobs and Civil Rights 93,
U.S. GOV’T PRINTING OFF. (1969)).
134. Id.
135. Id. at 136.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 138.
138. SKRENTNY, supra note 76, at 137 (writing that the Federal Executive Board consisted of
“regional federal officials of each contracting agenda in the area.”).
139. Id. at 137.
140. Id. at 138.
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Philadelphia Program, in that ranges would permit administrative
flexibility.141 The General Accounting Office, however, found the plan too
vague and therefore inconsistent with the Johnson Executive Order.142
According to the General Accounting Office, the Plan’s use of suggested
ranges “was defective because it did not contain definite minimum standards
on which approval or disapproval of an affirmative action program would be
based.”143 The implication was that a rigid racial quota rested on more solid
legal footing than a flexible goal.144 A Senate report on the Federal Highway
Act of 1968 reflected this emerging consensus that quotas are preferable.145
Indeed, the Senate report quoted the General Accounting Office for the
proposition that government contracts for the highway program “should
include a statement of definite minimum requirements to be met by the
bidder’s program, and any other standards or criteria by which the
acceptability of such program would be judged.”146
This shift toward explicit quotas in the late 1960s coincided with shifts
within the civil rights movement, which was quickly moving from peaceful
protesting to violent rioting.147 In accord with this shift, affirmative action
became decreasingly defended as an administrative tool for enforcing nondiscrimination. It became more about creating equality of results. This
equality rhetoric had an increasingly urgent nature to it, as race riots erupted
throughout the country. This rhetoric marked a transition, in John Skrentny’s
view, toward defending affirmative action as a tool “for elites to maintain
control, to manage a crisis.”148
As evidence of this shift, Skrentny points out how, in July 1967, in
response to the Newark riots, Attorney General Ramsey Clark wrote a letter
to President Johnson explaining how it would have been easier to control the
rioting had the National Guard had a more “visible Negro presence.”149 The
Attorney General’s letter cited the Army as advising that “steps should be
taken immediately to correct the racial imbalance.”150 That August, the
National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders recommended to
President Johnson that the Administration should “increase substantially the
recruitment of Negroes in the Army National Guard and Air National
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. SKRENTNY, supra note 76, at 138 (quoting James E. Jones, “The Bugaboo of Employment
Quotas”, 34 WISC. L. REV. 341, 360 (1970)).
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id. (quoting S. Rep. No. 90-1340, at 3497 (1968); Jones, supra note 167, at 361-64).
147. SKRENTNY, supra note 76, at 72.
148. Id. at 103.
149. Id. at 88 (quoting Memorandum from Attorney General Ramsey Clark to the President (Jul. 21,
1967)).
150. Id.
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Guard.”151 President Johnson passed the letter on to Defense Secretary
Robert S. McNamara, calling the hiring of blacks “a matter of highest
urgency.”152
As a direct response to the riots, the Johnson Administration administered
the Economic Opportunity Act in a race-based way, so that “[a]
disproportionate amount of funding for community action programs began to
go to urban areas with large black populations.”153 As Margaret Weird and
James Button have documented, the “black riots had a greater direct, positive
impact than any other independent variable upon total OEO [Office of
Economic Opportunity] expenditure increases in the latter 1960s.”154 This
commingling between civil rights and affirmative action became apparent
also in Martin Luther King’s activism, a significant shift given that,
throughout his career, King had been careful to avoid topics that would
alienate white liberals from his civil rights agenda.155 In King’s 1967
congressional testimony, on the significance of the race riots, King “came
about as close as possible,” in Skrentny’s opinion, “to advocating affirmative
action without actually doing so.”156 In one instance, King suggested the
possibility of “compensatory or preferential treatment”157 for blacks,
comparable to how India sought to deal with its caste system, and in that
testimony King defended something like a veterans’ Bill of Rights for “the
disadvantaged”—i.e., “a broad based and gigantic bill of rights for the
disadvantaged, our veterans of the long siege of denial.”158
The riots also had the effect of fusing public and private energies behind
affirmative action.159 In early 1968, the Johnson Administration devised a
new program, Job Opportunities in the Business Sector, providing
government subsidized job training in the private sector.160 The Job
Opportunities in the Business Sector program worked with the National
Alliance of Business, which Johnson personally oversaw, to secure jobs for
the program’s beneficiaries.161 After a year and a half, 150,000 persons had
been given jobs under the program, and 75 percent of the program’s

151. Id. (quoting Letter to President Johnson from Kerner Commission (Aug. 10, 1967)).
152. SKRENTNY, supra note 76, at 88 (quoting Memorandum for Honorable Robert S. McNamara
(Aug. 10, 1967)).
153. Id. at 89.
154. Id. (quoting James W. button, Black Violence 37 (1978)).
155. Id. at 96.
156. Id.
157. SKRENTNY, supra note 76, at 96 (quoting Civil Rights During the Johnson Administration, at
frame 0955 (Steven F. Lawson ed. 1984)).
158. Id.
159. Id. at 89-91.
160. Id. at 91.
161. Id.
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beneficiaries were black.162 Johnson was explicit in calling for black
employment as a way for government and business to manage the rioting,
stating: “You can put these people to work and you won’t have a revolution .
. . . Keep them busy and they won’t have time to burn your cars.”163
This willingness to depart from race-neutral hiring criteria was also
coming from the business community itself.164 In Skrentny’s words,
“business elites were increasingly advocating racial hiring” as a way to
manage the urban race crisis.165 A Harvard Business Review article, for
example, warned that, without affirmative action, American cities would be
overrun “with riots and arson and spreading slums.”166 The National Alliance
of Businessmen urged businesses “to give jobs to ghetto blacks before their
businesses burned down.”167 A U.S. New & World Report article observed
that a deviation from ordinary employment criteria, such as application tests
and criminal background checks, would be necessary “to ease discontentment
that has brought violence and destruction to many of America’s big cities in
recent summers.”168
The 1968 Kerner Report (on race relations and the riots) avoided taking
an explicit stance on affirmative action, but at many points it strongly hinted
at race-based hiring as a remedy for the crisis.169 For example, the Report
“strongly recommend[ed] that local government undertake a concerted effort
to provide substantial employment opportunities for ghetto residents.”170
Given that the term “ghetto” was almost exclusively used at the time to refer
to black neighborhoods, this was an unmistakable reference to affirmative
action. Likewise, the Report observed that “[r]acial discrimination and
unrealistic and unnecessarily high minimum qualifications for employment
or promotion often have the same prejudicial effect.”171 This was a sign that
race-neutral criteria should be scrutinized closely, and perhaps even
forbidden, if they had a disparate impact on the basis of race. In accord with
this close scrutiny, the Report “recommend[ed] that municipal authorities
162. SKRENTNY, supra note 76, at 91.
163. Id. at 91 (quoting Joseph A. Califano, The Triumph and Tragedy of Lyndon Johnson 225-26
(1991)).
164. Id. at 89-91.
165. Id. at 89.
166. Id. at 89 (quoting Alfonso J. Cervantes, To Prevent a Chain of Super-Watts, 45 Harv. Bus. Rev.
53, 56 (1967)).
167. SKRENTNY, supra note 76, at 90 (quoting Glenn K. Hirsch, Only You Can Prevent Ideological
Hegemony: The Advertising Council and Its Place in the American Power Structure, 5 THE INSURGENT
SOCIOLOGIST 64, 76 (1975)).
168. Id. (quoting U.S. News & World Report, Mar. 18, 1968, at 61).
169. Id. at 97.
170. Id. (quoting National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders, Report 294 (1968) [hereinafter
NACCD]).
171. Id. (quoting NACCD, supra note 170, at 416).
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review applicable civil service policies and job standards and take prompt
action to remove arbitrary barriers to employment of ghetto residents.”172 In
particular, the Report urged municipal authorities to question job
“requirements relating to employment qualification tests and police
records.”173
In line with the Kerner Report, the concept of “‘merit’ began to change
shape and meaning.”174 As one utility company acknowledged, applying
different hiring criteria for blacks was indeed “discrimination in reverse,” but
it was justified discrimination to achieve the promise of civil rights, because
“such steps are required to convince the Negroes that we are serious and want
them to apply for work with us.”175
It was quickly becoming clear that the civil rights movement would not
simply be about banning racial discrimination as such; it was, more
fundamentally, about managing America’s race problem. And this would
mean more than simply applying hiring criteria in a race-conscious way; it
would also require distributing jobs on a racial basis so as to guarantee
equality in results. Indeed, as President Johnson explained in a famous
commencement address at Howard University, his administration sought “not
just equality as a right and a theory but equality as a fact and equality as a
result.”176 The language of civil rights and affirmative action had become so
intermingled under the Johnson Administration that, as Christopher Caldwell
describes it, “[c]ivil rights meant affirmative action.”177
This same transition in rhetoric and operations was occurring within
university admissions. Indeed, Jerome Karabel’s The Chosen—an excellent
book on the Harvard, Yale, and Princeton admissions practices—
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.

SKRENTNY, supra note 76, at 97 (quoting NACCD, supra note 170, at 294).
Id. at 97 (quoting NACCD, supra note 170, at 294).
Id.
Id. at 91 (quoting U.S. News & World Report, Sept. 13, 1968, at 61-62).
Id. at 153 (quoting EEOC Administrative History, in CIVIL RIGHTS DURING THE JOHNSON
ADMINISTRATION, 1963-1969, at frame 0003 (Steven F. Lawson ed. 1984)). For the full speech, see
Lyndon B. Johnson, Commencement Address at Howard University: “To Fulfill These Rights.”, THE
AMERICAN PRESIDENCY PROJECT (June 4, 1965), https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/commenc
ement-address-howard-university-fulfill-these-rights. Johnson’s address is famous for announcing the
administration’s focus on equality of results rather than equality of form, despite the fact that the address
did not mention a single policy idea. This was, apparently, by design. The author of the speech explained
that Johnson sought to be vague in policy prescriptions, while seeking to make whites feel “a little guilty”
about the status of blacks. The advantage of this approach was that “the strong language and vagueness of
the Howard speech operated as carte blanche to any egalitarian initiative” and it could “therefore be used
as a precedent or a tradition to justify the affirmative action model pragmatically developing in the EEOC.”
This worked exactly as planned. Indeed, the EEOC, under Chairman Clifford Alexander, began citing the
speech as the basis for “asking business to focus on the racial makeup of the workforce.” In explaining
why this was not “reverse discrimination,” and therefore in violation of the Civil Rights Act, Chairman
Alexander would cite President Johnson’s Howard commencement address as evidence of why it was
permissible. See id. at 152-53.
177. CALDWELL, supra note 126, at 231.
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demonstrates how, coinciding with the rise of the civil rights movement in
the 1950s and 60s, the Big Three made substantial changes in their
admissions standards to increase black enrollment.178 More specifically,
Karabel points out how Harvard, Yale, and Princeton shifted their affirmative
action policies in the 1950s and 60s in accord with three distinct events: the
Supreme Court’s decision in Brown v. Board,179 the increased momentum of
the civil rights movement in the early 1960s, and the urban race riots in the
late 1960s. Below, I will draw from Karabel’s research to highlight how the
progression of affirmative action at various elite colleges and universities in
the 1960s operated in concert with the federal government’s expanding
affirmative action programs.180
B. Affirmative Action Comes to the Ivy League
The single most important institution to the migration of affirmative
action into higher education was Harvard University, and the single most
important figure in Harvard’s creation of affirmative action was John U.
Monro. In 1948, Monro, at the time working in Harvard’s Office Veterans
Affairs, “began organizing summer recruiting trips, first to Chicago and then
to the South, to recruit Black students to Harvard.”181 In 1950, Monro became
Harvard’s Director of Financial Aid and in this capacity Monro persuaded
Harvard to develop its recruitment of black students by working with the
National Scholarship Service and Fund for Negro Students, an organization
for which Monro served on the board of directors.182 In 1958, Monro became
Dean of the College, a position he held for ten years, until he left Harvard for
Miles College, a black college that at the time was still not accredited.183
These ten years under Monro’s leadership were critical to Harvard’s role as
the nation’s affirmative action leader. In 1959, Harvard created the so-called
“Gamble Fund,” funded by the Taconic Foundation.184 Although the Gamble
Fund was crafted in race-neutral terms (the program was designed to recruit
“economic and culturally impoverished” students in the South), black
students were the program’s “major beneficiaries,” with 18 black students in

178. JEROME KARABEL, THE CHOSEN: THE HIDDEN HISTORY OF ADMISSION AND EXCLUSION AT
HARVARD, YALE, AND PRINCETON 8-9 (2005).
179. 347 U.S. at 495 (striking down the doctrine of “separate but equal” in public education).
180. See infra Part II.B.
181. David B. Oppenheimer, Archibald Cox and the Diversity Justification for Affirmative Action,
25 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 158, 177 (2018); see also TONI-LEE CAPOSSELA, JOHN U. MONRO: UNCOMMON
EDUCATOR 1, 3 (2012).
182. Id. at 56, 83.
183. This decision was so shocking that it garnered national headline media attention See, e.g., Fred
M. Hechinger, Dean Quits Harvard to Aid Negro College, NY Times 1 (March 10, 1967).
184. Id.
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the program’s first three years.185 The Gamble Fund sought to help students
prepare for Harvard by sending them to Andover the summer before their
freshmen year.186 In some cases, students were sent to Andover for an entire
year of preparation before enrolling in Harvard.187
It is important to note that at this point Harvard’s affirmative action
program was limited, at least as a matter of formal policy, to special
recruitment efforts.
Although
Karabel quotes one “well-informed
observer”188 for the proposition that by the late 1950s “affirmative action was
already institutional policy” in Harvard admissions, 189 in that Harvard had a
practice of “go[ing] out of its way [to admit black students]” and would “take
a boy with inadequate test scores if there are indicators he will develop,”190
this racial preference had not yet been expressed as a formal policy at
Harvard.191
It is also noteworthy that, as late as the early 1960s, Yale was explicitly
against race-based treatment of the SAT.192 In 1960, for example, after Yale’s
special recruitment efforts managed to yield only five black students out of a
class of 1,000,193 Yale explicitly addressed whether it should apply different
admissions standards on the basis of race.194 Dean of Admission Arthur
Howe Jr. rejected this proposal on the ground that black applicants should be
expected to “meet the same standards required of other applicants.”195 This
“same standard” principle was on display in how Yale’s special recruitment
program had found a top black student, a student with great leadership skills
who had been number one in his high school class of 500, but even though
Yale had recruited him, Yale still ended up rejecting him, due to his
“averaging only 488 on the SAT,” well below the school’s bottom tenth
percentile.196 This rejection was, in the admission’s officer’s words, “the
price we pay for our academic standards.”197 Within just a few years, this
rejection based on the student’s SAT score would become doubtful, perhaps
even unthinkable.

185. Id.
186. KARABEL, supra note 178, at 400.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 400.
189. Id. at 401 (quoting Charles Puttkammer, Negroes in the Ivy League 19 (1962)).
190. Id. at 401 (quoting Puttkammer, supra note 189, at 19).
191. KARABEL, supra note 178, at 402.
192. Id. at 379.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 380.
195. KARABEL, supra note 178, at 380 (quoting Letter from Arthur Howe Jr. to Connelly Edwards
(Mar. 30, 1960)).
196. Id.
197. Id. (quoting Katherine T. Kinkead, The Brightest Ever, NEW YORKER, Sept. 10, 1960).
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Indeed, as the civil rights movement picked up pace and demands for
more black students heightened, the demands for race-based treatment of
academic credentials intensified.198 In the fall of 1962, President Kennedy
organized a meeting consisting of the leaders of five major universities,
including Harvard and Yale.199 In that meeting, President Kennedy implored
these major universities to take a more aggressive position on racial equality
and justice.200 Kingman Brewster Jr., who was Yale’s representative at that
meeting, became Yale’s acting president the following year.201 In 1964, the
year after Brewster became Yale’s president, Brewster awarded Martin
Luther King Jr. an honorary doctorate, an unmistakable sign that Yale was
beginning to place race relations at the forefront of its mission.202
Nevertheless, “despite vigorous efforts to identify qualified black candidates
and to help them meet Yale’s standards,”203 Yale still managed to enroll only
14 African-Americans that year, fewer than 2 percent of the incoming
freshman class.204
Once again, Yale considered formally adopting different admissions
standards on the basis of race.205 But this was met, yet again, by resistance,
as the Governing Board of the Committee on Admissions expressed “no
interest in suddenly opening the gates solely to increase the number of Negro
and foreign students, unless they were qualified according to the same criteria
used to judge all other candidates.”206 George May, Dean of Yale College,
similarly expressed “strong opposition” against race-based admissions
standards.207
That year, an Ivy League school outside of the Big Three, Dartmouth
College, became the first school after Harvard to go on the record in formally
recognizing its affirmative action program.208 In a March 1962 letter, the
Dartmouth director of admissions wrote that it was common practice for
Dartmouth to “take into account the background from which a boy comes.”209
It was clear from the context that, by “background,” the admissions director
198. See id. at 380-85.
199. Id. at 381.
200. KARABEL, supra note 178, at 381.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Id. at 383.
204. Id.
205. KARABEL, supra note 178, at 383.
206. Id. (quoting Minutes of the Committee on Admissions and Freshmen Scholarships, Yale U.
(Oct. 26, 1964)).
207. Id.
208. Lisa M. Stulberg & Anthony S. Chen, The Origins of Race-Conscious Affirmative Action in
Undergraduate Admissions: A Comparative Analysis of Institutional Change in Higher Education, 87
SOC. EDUC. 36, 42 (2013).
209. Id. (quoting Letter to George Kalbeleish from Leeman D. Thompson (Nov. 6, 1963)).
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was referring to racial background, as the letter continued by explaining that
“we bend over backward to help Negroes if they can show any capacity at all
for handling the work at a place like Dartmouth College.”210 As an observer
later wrote about the 1960s Dartmouth affirmative action policy, “most of the
selection criteria used for [white] applicants are not applicable [for black
applicants].”211
In 1963, the following year, two more Ivies, the University of
Pennsylvania and Columbia, went on the record in formally recognizing their
own affirmative action policies.212 In February of 1963, The Daily
Pennsylvanian, the University of Pennsylvania’s student newspaper, ran a
story on the University’s affirmative action program; in that story, the Dean
of Admissions, William G. Owen, acknowledged that the University applied
different admissions standards to students on the basis of race.213 A similar
article ran in the Columbia Spectator in October of that year. In that article,
entitled ‘‘Colleges Seek Negro Applicants,” Columbia’s Dean Henry S.
Coleman acknowledged that Columbia applied different SAT standards to
different racial groups.214
As other Ivy League schools followed Harvard’s lead, the pressure built
for Princeton, traditionally the most conservative of the Big Three, to get on
board.215 In 1964, Princeton became the first Ivy League institution to hire a
black administrator, a clear sign that Princeton was seeking to compete in
terms of its racial liberalism.216 The following year, Alden Dunham, the
Princeton director of admissions, wrote an article in the alumni magazine on
Princeton’s policy of seeking out “qualified Negroes” as part of Princeton’s
role in fulfilling “a responsibility to be responsive to the nation’s need for
men who can fulfill important leadership roles.”217
That year, 1964, two more Ivies, Brown and Cornell, also adopted formal
affirmative action programs.218 Cornell created the Cornell Opportunities
Program, which, according to an article in the Cornell Daily Sun, admitted
black students “without reference to any specific requirements for

210. Id. at 42-43.
211. Id. at 43 (quoting REPORT OF TRUSTEES’ COMMITTEE ON EQUAL OPPORTUNITY, DARTMOUTH
COLLEGE (Dec. 1968)).
212. Id.
213. James J. Lack, Admission Head Seeks Top Negro Applicants, DAILY PENNSYLVANIAN, Feb.
26, 1963, at 1.
214. Edward J. Rubenstein, Colleges Seek Negro Applicants, COLUMBIA SPECTATOR, Oct. 15, 1963,
at 1.
215. KARABEL, supra note 178, at 392.
216. Id. at 394.
217. Id. (quoting E. Alden Dunham, A Look at Princeton Admissions, PRINCETON ALUMNI
WEEKLY, Jan. 19, 1965).
218. Stulberg & Chen, supra note 208, at 41.
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admission.”219 Cornell President James Perkins explicitly linked Cornell’s
affirmative action program to the civil rights movement, particularly the
Supreme Court’s Brown decision.220
That was a critical year, as two elite liberal arts colleges, Swarthmore and
Wesleyan, and two elite state universities, UCLA and Michigan, became the
first non-Ivies to adopt affirmative action programs.221 As early as 1960,
Swarthmore’s president admitted privately that the college had a practice of
“leaning over backwards” for black applicants and “mak[ing]concessions in
matters such as Board score performance.”222 But Swarthmore did not launch
a formal affirmative action program until 1964, when it received a $275,000
grant from the Rockefeller Foundation for the purposes of recruiting and
funding black student enrollment.223 In 1964, Wesleyan University hired the
Swarthmore Dean of Admissions for the purpose of creating a similar
affirmative action program.224 The new Dean of Admissions helped
Wesleyan to receive the same Rockefeller affirmative action grant.225 That
year, Wesleyan, under the leadership of the new Dean of Admissions, adopted
“different criteria for admission” so that “test scores were not to be used in
the same way” for black applicants.226 This produced an immediate boost in
black enrollment at Wesleyan, increasing 1,457 percent over just three years
(from .7 percent of the 1964 freshman class to 10.9 percent of the 1967
freshman class).227
Not to be outdone, Harvard and Yale began shifting beyond their
recruitment measures.228 In 1965, Yale’s President Brewster appointed Inky
Clark as Yale’s Dean of Admissions, a man who “realized that a change in
the definition of merit was required if black enrollment was to increase
substantially.”229 That very year, Yale “moved rapidly to make their promise
of a more racially diverse Yale a reality,”230 and the Admissions Policy
Advisory Board explicitly acknowledged that admissions officers “must be
prepared to take more risks”231 on black applicants. As one faculty member
219. Betty Mills, Home Economics Admissions to Employ COSEP Program, CORNELL DAILY SUN,
Dec. 15, 1967, at 1, 14.
220. Stulberg & Chen, supra note 208, at 41.
221. Id. at 41-42.
222. Id. at 42 (quoting Letter from Courtney Smith to Mrs. Lawrence B. Arguimbau (Dec. 19, 1960).
223. Id.
224. Stulberg & Chen, supra note 208, at 42.
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. See KARABEL, supra note 178, at 380-92, 400-05.
229. Id. at 384.
230. Id.
231. Id. (quoting Admissions Policy Advisory Board, Second Report 12-13, Yale U. (OCT. 31,
1966)).
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put it, Yale had to fulfill its “national obligation to participate actively in the
education of Negroes.”232 To fulfill this obligation, Yale concluded, “it is
necessary . . . to look behind the usual quantitative measures of academic
achievement.”233
This push to look beyond the usual quantitative measures became even
more urgent after a 1967 Harvard study on race and SAT performance
concluded that “only 1.2 percent of the nation’s male black high school
graduates could be expected to score as high as 500 on the verbal section of
the SAT and a mere three-tenths of one percent as high as 550.”234 To put
that in perspective, that same year, 1967, the median SAT scores for Harvard
admitted students were 697 verbal and 708 math. 235 The implication of the
study was clear: Elite universities would need to apply radically different
admissions standards on the basis of race.
Ironically, Princeton, which had been the slowest to adopt a special
recruitment program, was the quickest of the Big Three to modify its
admissions criteria.236 For the years between 1963 and 1966, Princeton had
over a 200-point SAT difference for black students and the overall student
population (for this period, Princeton’s black students averaged 550 verbal
and 590 math on the SATs, whereas the class overall averaged 650 verbal and
695 math).237 Harvard and Yale would soon follow in explicitly modifying
their admissions standards.238
According to Karabel, the biggest factor prompting Harvard and Yale’s
shifts was the racial rioting of the late 1960s, both on and off campus.239 In
1968, the recently organized Black Student Alliance of Yale (BSAY) met
with the Yale administration and demanded more black students.240 Over the
next few months, the racial politics on college campuses became more
militant, and in January 1969, the BSAY “demand[ed] that 12 percent of the
incoming class be blacks.”241 President Clark agreed to the goal while
hedging that “we cannot hold out the promise of achieving any target if it

232. Id.
233. KARABEL, supra note 178, at 384 (quoting Admissions Policy Advisory Board, supra note 231,
at 12-13).
234. Id. at 382-83.
235. Report of the President of Harvard College and Reports of Departments, p. 103, available at
https://iiif.lib.harvard.edu/manifests/view/drs:427268818$105i.
236. See KARABEL, supra note 178, at 392-400.
237. Id. at 395.
238. See id. at 380-92, 400-05.
239. Id. at 390.
240. Id. at 390.
241. KARABEL, supra note 178, at 390.

https://digitalcommons.onu.edu/onu_law_review/vol48/iss1/4

26

Merriam: Beyond the Law: A Four-Step Explanation of Why AffirmativeAction

2021]

BEYOND THE LAW: A FOUR-STEP EXPLANATION

121

would mean admitting students who . . . would not be likely to meet Yale’s
requirements.”242
Similar events were occurring at Harvard.243 In 1968, the Harvard black
student organization demanded that Harvard “admit a number of Black
students proportionate to our percentage of the population as a whole.”244
Chase Peterson, the new Dean of Admissions, did not quite agree to the quota,
but in April 1968, Peterson, in a joint statement with the Ad Hoc Committee
of Black Students, agreed that in the coming year Harvard would enroll “a
substantially higher number of black students.”245
Campus racial violence escalated in the coming year.246 On April 9,
1969, there was a campus conflict in which 48 people needed medical care
and 145 Harvard and Radcliffe students were arrested for their involvement
in the violence.247 This was less than a week before admissions decisions
were to be made under the agreement; according to Admissions Dean
Peterson, “there was a serious question as to whether the admissions office
itself would be attacked and whether we would be able to complete our
procedures and mail our letters by April fifteenth.”248 Two weeks later,
another campus conflict occurred over the newly created Department of AfroAmerican Studies.249 This conflict led Harvard to hire its first black
admissions officer, and to alter its admissions criteria “to take still greater
account of the limitation of background schooling that shaped the
qualifications of many black candidates.”250
The number of black students at Harvard increased dramatically: “The
first class admitted after the agreement, selected in 1969, had far more black
students than any previous class.”251 The post-riot affirmative action program
produced 90 black students in a class of 1202, almost 8 percent of the student
body, “a 76 percent increase over the 51 black freshmen in 1968.”252 To get
such a large increase, Harvard had to modify its admissions criteria further,
so that there was a nearly 200-point SAT gap between black freshmen and
the freshmen class as a whole (black freshmen had a 1202 median SAT score,
242. Id. at 390-391 (quoting Jeffrey Gordon, Inky’s Era, YALE ALUMNI MAGAZINE, March 1970, at
35).
243. Id. at 402.
244. Id. (quoting Joel R. Kramer, University Will Not Move on Afro’s Focus Requests, HARVARD
CRIMSON, Apr. 11, 1968).
245. Id.
246. KARABEL, supra note 178, at 402.
247. Id. at 402-03.
248. Id. at 402 (quoting Charles J. Hamilton, Peterson Pledges Search for More Black Students,
HARVARD CRIMSON, Apr. 30, 1968).
249. Id. at 403.
250. Id. at 403.
251. KARABEL, supra note 178, at 403.
252. Id.
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whereas the freshmen class as a whole had a 1385 median).253 By 1971,
Harvard’s legacy preferences (i.e., preferences for the children of alumni),
which had long been a critical part of Harvard’s operations, were outmatched
by Harvard’s racial preferences (i.e., preferences for black applicants).254
Princeton underwent similar changes in the late 1960s. In the fall of
1967, Princeton, in its annual “Report to Schools,” issued a call for more
black applicants, the University’s “first such appeal since 1963.”255 Princeton
made it clear that it would be applying different admissions standards, a
particularly startling transition given that Princeton already had a 200-point
SAT difference between white and black admissions in the preceding few
years.256 The Report explained how, because “the need for Negro leadership
is particularly urgent at the present time,” the Princeton Admissions Office
would “interpret fairly credentials of students from non-traditional
backgrounds, realizing that their test scores, academic records, and leisure
time activities are often different.”257 Princeton explicitly explained that “the
increasingly violent racial disturbances that shook the nation’s cities in the
summer of 1967 were the main cause of the change in its admissions
policy.”258 That admissions year, “Princeton not only accepted late
applications from black candidates but actively encouraged them.”259 The
following year, 1968, saw more racial unrest on Princeton’s campus, as black
students engaged in several campus occupations in response to college
policies, prompting Princeton to “alter[] its admissions policies yet again.”260
By 1970, Princeton had a vast affirmative action program, consisting of three
principal components: (1) an extensive special recruitment program, (2) a
newly constructed admissions committee, along with a “single member of the
staff writing assessments of all candidates deemed ‘disadvantaged,’”261 and
(3) a modified way of looking at merit for black applicants so as to look
beyond “the kind of academic record that would lead to admission under
ostensibly color-blind criteria.”262 In 1970, Princeton’s affirmative action
program yielded the most significant black ratio of any of the Big Three, an
astonishing 10.4 percent of the student body.263 As a testament to the
revolutionary time period, and the ways in which affirmative action changed
253.
254.
255.
256.
257.
258.
259.
260.
261.
262.
263.

Id. at 404.
Id.
Id. at 396.
KARABEL, supra note 178, at 395.
Id. at 396 (quoting Office of Admission, “Report to Schools,” 1967, 4).
Id. at 397.
Id.
Id. at 398.
KARABEL, supra note 178, at 398.
Id.
Id.
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during the civil rights movement, Princeton went from being a school that did
not admit a single black student for three consecutive years in the 1950s to
being more than ten percent black in 1970.264
By the end of the civil rights era, affirmative action had become a formal
national program, extending to various areas of public, private, and academic
life. But it was still circumscribed in three ways. One, it was generally
justified as a short-term remedy to address the grievances of the civil rights
era, not as a long-term policy tool that would survive generations after the
civil rights movement had ended. Two, it was not only tethered to the civil
rights era, but it was still at this point affiliated with a liberal or leftist political
perspective, without the legitimacy of bipartisanship and legal authorization.
Three, it was limited to elite institutions. Although affirmative action had
spread in the 1960s from Harvard to the rest of the Ivies, several elite liberal
arts colleges, and a few elite public universities, it still was not seen as
integrally part of the educational enterprise altogether. All of this would
change in Phase 3, when affirmative action became entrenched in American
politics, law, and education.
III.

PHASE THREE: THE ENTRENCHMENT PERIOD

At the close of the 1960s, it would have been reasonable to think of
affirmative action in the public employment context in quite narrow terms, as
something that only the Democratic Party pushed—and perhaps, even more
narrowly, as only a short-term measure in response to the exigencies wrought
by the civil rights era. Affirmative action in higher education would have
appeared similarly narrow, as a program that only the Ivy League schools
pushed—and perhaps, even more narrowly, only as part of a short-term
measure to train black leaders who would operate, in Karabel’s words, as
“bridges between the white establishment and the increasingly disaffected
black population of the nation’s ghettos.”265 Although affirmative action had
existed in a limited form before the civil rights movement, as discussed in
Part I, it did not take shape until the civil rights movement. So when Richard
Nixon was elected in 1968, on a campaign that emphasized law and order and
the need to push back against civil rights, it seemed that the civil rights era
was done, and so were the affirmative action initiatives that had accompanied
it.266 But that is exactly the opposite of what happened. Instead of eliminating
affirmative action, the Nixon election began the process of entrenching
affirmative action as an enduring part of American law and politics.267 More
264.
265.
266.
34 (1990).
267.

Id.
KARABEL, supra note 178, at 398.
HERMAN BELZ, EQUALITY TRANSFORMED: A QUARTER CENTURY OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION
Id. at 51.
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specifically, between the election of Richard Nixon in 1968 and the Supreme
Court’s decision in Bakke ten years later, three events helped transform
affirmative action into a fundamental part of American politics, law, and
education.268 These three events constitute what I have dubbed the third
phase – or the entrenchment phase – of affirmative action.
A. President Nixon and the Philadelphia Plan
The first event occurred shortly after Richard Nixon became president.
In 1969, President Nixon resuscitated the Johnson Administration’s
Philadelphia Plan, which, as discussed in Part II.A, had been rejected by the
Comptroller General in 1968 for being too vague.269 Nixon sought to redress
this defect by requiring bidders for federal construction contracts in the
Philadelphia area to submit “acceptable affirmative action”270 programs that
would “include specific goals of minority manpower utilization.”271 Unlike
the Johnson Administration’s program, the Nixon Administration defined the
permissible ranges for these specific goals, with the range increasing by 5
percentage points in minority representation until hitting roughly 25 percent
minority (depending on the industry) in 1973.272
Why did Nixon, who had just been elected for his opposition to the
perceived excesses of the civil rights movement under the Johnson
Administration, take the striking position of not only adopting Johnson’s
most aggressive affirmative action policy but also making it even more
ambitious in terms of providing for explicit quotas?273 While Nixon was
certainly not a foe of civil rights—indeed, as discussed in Part I, Nixon had
been the chairman of the Government Contracts Committee in the
Eisenhower Administration274—three strategic factors seemed to be driving
his creation of the modified Philadelphia Plan.275
One, Nixon had won the 1968 election by walking the middle line
between the pro-civil rights position of Democrat Hubert Humphrey (leading
architect of the 1964 Civil Rights Act) and the reactionary views of thirdparty candidate George Wallace (governor of Alabama and outspoken critic
of integration).276 Nixon’s 1968 campaign strategy was to campaign against
the excesses of the civil rights movement (in particular, forced busing) so as
268. See infra Part III.A.-C.
269. See supra Part II.A.; SKRENTNY, supra note 76, at 138.
270. Order from Arthur A. Fletcher § 3, June 27, 1969, United States Dep’t of Labor, 115 CONG.
REC. 17,133 (daily ed. Dec. 18, 1969) [hereinafter cited as June 27 order].
271. Id.
272. BELZ, supra note 266, at 36.
273. Id. at 34-35.
274. See supra Part I.
275. SKRENTNY, supra note 76, at 184.
276. Id.
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to attract the Southern white vote without alienating more moderate
Republican voters in the North.277 Nixon’s so-called “Southern strategy” was
quite controversial, especially among blacks and white liberals, so that when
he came into office, Nixon needed to build some political capital if he wanted
to take action against forced busing.278 Affirmative action was the easiest
way for Nixon to assuage concerns that he was more like the reactionary
Wallace than like the liberal Humphrey.279 As Herman Belz observed,
“These conflicting pressures led the Nixon Administration to take a more
conservative position on race-conscious remedies in school desegregation
and a more liberal one on preferential treatment in employment
discrimination policy.”280 A second factor driving Nixon’s support of the
Philadelphia Plan was his black outreach strategy.281 Some of his leading
strategists believed that middle-class blacks were becoming disenchanted
with the Democratic Party.282 Supporting the Philadelphia Plan, they
predicted, promised greater Republican support among middle-class blacks,
in part because they would see themselves as potential beneficiaries of
Nixon’s affirmative action efforts.283
Finally, not only would the
Philadelphia Plan curry favor with black voters, but it would also weaken
Nixon’s greatest political opponent, the labor unions.284 As discussed in Part
II.A, by the end of the 1960s, business elites had become some of the leading
voices in support of affirmation action.285 But labor unions were still some
of the leading critics. Belz writes that this was a weakness for the Democratic
Party: “Democratic unity on civil rights was fragile, especially with respect
to employment discrimination—where the black lobby and organized labor
were potential enemies.”286 By pushing the Philadelphia Plan, Nixon hoped
to drive a wedge in the Democratic Party coalition between black voters and
labor unions.287
While it may have seemed at the time as a devious way for President
Nixon to weaken affirmative action, split the Democratic Party coalition, and
thereby stultify the civil rights momentum, the Philadelphia Plan had the
opposite effect. That is, it functioned to strengthen affirmative action, to
weaken the conservative backlash, and to create a permanent civil rights
277.
278.
279.
280.
281.
282.
283.
284.
285.
286.
287.

Id. at 184-85, 187.
Id. at 181, 187.
Id. at 184.
BELZ, supra note 266, at 35.
SKRENTNY, supra note 76, at 186-87.
Id. at 187.
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BELZ, supra note 266, at 35.
See supra Part II.A.
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regime.288 Indeed, the Democratic Party at the time was uneasy with quotas,
as this would require it to alienate what was left of its white working-class
constituency.289 What the Democratic Party needed was for a Republican to
do it.290 As John Skrentny writes, “[a]ll that remained to legitimate a new
civil rights policy for the Left was for a right-leaning president to enter the
scene” and adopt affirmative action for a conservative cause.291 Bruce
Ackerman therefore views President Nixon as the final element in enshrining
the civil rights movement as a “constitutional movement,” that is, as creating
a transformation of our constitutional order outside of the rigid procedures of
Article V.292 Rogers Smith likewise sees in Nixon a critical force in making
the civil rights revolution, and therefore affirmative action, a center-piece of
American politics.293 Shelby Steele, an African-American conservative critic
of affirmative action, also locates Nixon at the center of this revolution:
“Racial quotas came in during the Nixon administration, not because
Republicans believed in them, but because they lacked the moral authority to
resist them.”294
Whether Nixon was acting strategically, as Skrentny believes, or in a
more principled way, as Ackerman suggests, or more submissively, as Steele
alleges, the outcome of Nixon’s Philadelphia Plan was clear: Affirmative
action was no longer just about the civil rights era or a particular political
party.295 It was now firmly grounded in American politics. The next
significant event in Phase 3 would be to root the practice in American law.
B. Judicial Authorization
The first major federal lawsuit over affirmative action was Porcelli v.
Titus,296 which arose from the Newark School Board’s 1968 effort to promote
black teachers to be vice-principals and principals, a decision that was made
in response to the 1967 Newark riots.297 Ten white teachers sued the City for
288. Id. at 37.
289. Id. at 34-35; SKRENTNY, supra note 76, at 186.
290. Id. at 224.
291. Id.
292. See, e.g., 3 BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, The Civil Rights Revolution, in 3 WE THE PEOPLE 77-78,
182-83 (2014).
293. Rogers M. Smith, Ackerman’s Civil Rights Revolution and Modern American Racial Politics,
123 YALE L.J. 2906, 2911 (2014).
294. CLINT BOLICK, THE AFFIRMATIVE ACTION FRAUD: CAN WE RESTORE THE AMERICAN CIVIL
RIGHTS VISION? 115 (1996) (quoting Shelby Steele, How Liberals Lost Their Virtue Over Race,
Newsweek (Jan. 8, 1995, 7:00 PM), https://www.newsweek.com/how-liberals-lost-their-virtue-over-race182026)).
295. See SKRENTNY, supra note 76, at 224; ACKERMAN, supra note 292, at 77-78; BOLICK, supra
note 294, at 115 (quoting Steele, supra note 294).
296. 302 F.Supp. 726 (1969).
297. See id. at 729; SKRENTNY, supra note 76, at 102.
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violating the Fourteenth Amendment and Title VII by suspending the
“promotion lists” and “abolish[ing] the examination procedure for the
purpose of appointing Negroes to positions for which they would not
otherwise be eligible.”298 The district court conceded that race “played a part
in the Board’s decision to suspend the promotion lists and abandon the
examination system,”299 but the district court found that this was not in
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment and Title VII because “the Board had
the authority to take such steps as it deemed necessary and proper to promote
the educational welfare of the Newark school community.”300 The Third
Circuit affirmed the decision and even went so far as to suggest that the action
taken by Newark may be necessary under the Fourteenth Amendment,
because strict color-blindness “would be in negation of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the Constitution and the line of cases which have followed
Brown v. Board of Education.”301
The following year, the Third Circuit heard another affirmative action
case, this one arising over President Nixon’s Philadelphia Plan.302 As
discussed in Part II.A, the Comptroller General had invalidated Johnson’s
Philadelphia Plan for being too vague. To address this problem, the Nixon
plan consisted of precise numeric timetables.303 Immediately after Nixon’s
plan was put into place, the Contractors Association of Eastern Pennsylvania
challenged Nixon’s numeric timetables as operating as a racial hiring quota,
in violation of, among other things, the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Fifth
Amendment’s Due Process Clause.304 The district court dismissed the lawsuit
for lack of standing.305 On appeal, the Third Circuit held that the Contractors
Association had standing but rejected the challenge on its merits.306 The
thrust of the court’s reasoning was that the Department of Labor had broad
discretion to enforce affirmative action, including the implementation of
quotas.307 This was because the Civil Rights Act’s “general prohibition
against discrimination cannot be construed as limiting Executive authority in
defining appropriate affirmative action on the part of a contractor.”308 And
President Johnson’s Executive Order 11246 (the basis for the Philadelphia
Plan) gave the Department of Labor a “broad delegation of authority” that
298.
299.
300.
301.
302.
303.
304.
305.
306.
307.
308.

Porcelli, 302 F.Supp. at 729, 732.
Id. at 732.
Id. at 736.
Porcelli v. Titus, 431 F.2d 1254, 1257-58 (3d Cir. 1970).
Contractors Ass’n of Eastern Pennsylvania v. Sec’y of Labor, 311 F.Supp. 1002, 1004 (1970).
SKRENTNY, supra note 76, at 138; BELZ, supra note 266, at 36.
Contractors Ass’n of Eastern Pennsylvania, 311 F.Supp. at 1008.
Id. at 1007.
Contractors Ass’n of Eastern Pennsylvania v. Sec’y of Labor, 442 F.2d 159, 166 (3d Cir. 1971).
Id. at 174-75.
Id. at 173.
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permitted the Department to “interpret[] ‘affirmative action’ to require more
than mere policing against actual present discrimination.”309 While
conceding that “the Philadelphia Plan is color conscious,” the court
maintained that this “color consciousness” is precisely what Title VII permits
as a remedy, and precisely what the Kennedy and Johnson executive orders
required.310
That year, in Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,311 the Supreme Court heard its
first affirmative action case, a case that secured the status of affirmative
action under the Civil Rights Act.312 The Griggs case arose after Duke Power,
a power generating facility, adopted two possible methods for promotions—
having a high school diploma or passing an intelligence test.313 Because black
workers disproportionately failed to satisfy these conditions, they sued on the
ground that Duke Power had violated the Civil Rights Act of 1964 by using
a means of promotion that disproportionately denied promotions to black
employees.314 The NAACP brought the case to the Supreme Court, and in its
brief, the NAACP argued that the Civil Rights Act does not merely ban
outright discrimination; rather, the NAACP argued, the lower courts had
correctly interpreted the Act ‘“to give it a broad and flexible’” application, so
that it would prohibit even race-neutral employment decisions that have the
effect of treating racial groups differently.315 This “broad and flexible”
approach would give “Title VII the potential for becoming an effective force
for fair employment in contrast to the many state fair employment laws which
languished under restrictive applications.”316 The NAACP argued that now
that “outright and open exclusion of Negroes is passe,” the next line of legal
attack under Title VII must be against ‘“the use of neutral, objective criteria
which systematically reduce Negro job opportunity.’”317 The NAACP brief
even cited the Kerner Report for the proposition that “racial discrimination
and unrealistic and unnecessarily high minimum qualifications for
employment or promotion have the same prejudicial effect.”318 As explained
by Skrentny, the NAACP’s strategy was to use the federal government’s
Kerner Report, and its linkage between black employment and the

309. Id. at 175; Exec. Order No. 11246, 30 Fed. Reg. at 12,319.
310. Contractors Ass’n of Eastern Pennsylvania, 442 F.2d at 173.
311. 401 U.S. at 424.
312. SKRENTNY, supra note 76, at 166.
313. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 425-26.
314. Id. at 426.
315. SKRENTNY, supra note 76, at 186 (quoting Brief for Petitioner at 9, Griggs v. Duke Power
Company, 420 F.2d 1225 (4th Cir. 1970)).
316. Id. (quoting Brief for Petitioner, at 16, Griggs, 420 F.2d at 1225).
317. Id. (quoting Brief for Petitioner, at 25, Griggs, 420 F.2d at 1225).
318. Brief for Petitioner, at 19, Griggs, 420 F.2d at 1225 (quoting NACCD, supra note 194, at 416).
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government’s management of the race riots, to nudge the Court to take on its
role in managing American race relations.319
In a unanimous opinion written by Chief Justice Burger, the Supreme
Court agreed with the black workers, holding that employment tests are
presumptively invalid if they have a disparate impact on the basis of race.320
The Court interpreted Title VII as being about more than racial discrimination
as such: “The objective of Congress in the enactment of Title VII is plain
from the language of the status. It was to achieve equality of employment
opportunities and remove barriers that have operated in the past to favor an
identifiable group of white employees over other employees.”321 This means
that, “[u]nder the Act, practices, procedures, or tests neutral on their face, and
even neutral in terms of intent, cannot be maintained if they operated to
‘freeze’ the status of quo of prior discriminatory employment practices.”322
In other words, not only did Title VII not ban affirmative action, as the Third
Circuit had held, but it also required it.323 While the Griggs decision did not
explicitly mandate quotas, this was the obvious implication of the decision,324
because if an employer wanted to avoid Title VII litigation, the easiest way
to do so was to ensure a racial balance of its employees.325 In the words of
Herman Belz, “Griggs shifted civil rights policy to a group-rights, equalityof-result rationale that made the social consequences of employment
practices, rather than their purposes, intent, or motivation, the decisive
consideration in determining their lawfulness.”326 By creating a threat of
Title VII liability for any business practice that had a disparate impact on the
basis of race, the Griggs decision supplied both a “theoretical basis”327 as well
as a very real “practical incentive” for employers to adopt racial
preferences.328
This was a critical step toward entrenching affirmative action. As
Skrentny writes, “Griggs legitimated, by the highest authority in the land, the
idea that race was a reality in American life that must be recognized in
everyday practice.”329 Griggs, in other words, established new “boundaries
of legitimate actions,” so that after Griggs, “for a judge to challenge
[affirmative action] would mean risking legitimacy as a judge.”330 The result
319.
320.
321.
322.
323.
324.
325.
326.
327.
328.
329.
330.

SKRENTNY, supra note 76, at 168.
Griggs, 401 U.S. at 429.
Id. at 429-30.
Id. at 430.
BELZ, supra note 266, at 51.
See id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
BELZ, supra note 266, at 51.
SKRENTNY, supra note 76, at 170.
Id. at 174.
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of this legitimation was that affirmative action was now unmoored from the
contingencies of a particular political party, social movement, or historic
cause.331 Indeed, by the early 1970s, affirmative action had become another
tool in American public policy, at the disposal of both political parties. The
parties would end up dividing on many issues. But they had coalesced around
affirmative action. The next step to entrench this practice was for it to spread
throughout higher education.
C. Affirmative Action Permeates Higher Education
Most discussions of the legality of affirmative action in higher education
begin with Bakke. But before Bakke, there had been a similar lawsuit that
reached the Supreme Court, DeFunis v. Odegaard.332 This lawsuit
highlighted the extent to which affirmative action was spreading throughout
higher education in the early 1970s.
The lawsuit arose after Marco DeFunis, a University of Washington
graduate of Sephardic Jewish ancestry, was denied admission to the law
school.333 DeFunis had strong academic credentials, but he had lived all his
life in Washington State and applied to the less-competitive University of
Washington Law School “for personal, financial, and family reasons.”334 He
was rejected twice, in 1970 and 1971, and he believed he was rejected
because the University of Washington, under the leadership of President
Charles Odegaard, had recently promulgated an affirmative action program
for the entire university.335 Because the state trial court had ruled in
DeFunis’s favor and ordered his immediate admission, the law school
admitted DeFunis in 1971.336 Therefore, by the time the Supreme Court heard
the case in fall of 1973, DeFunis was already in his final year of law school.337
Although his lawsuit certainly seemed like a live controversy, in that he had
not yet graduated and the Supreme Court’s ruling in Washington’s favor
would likely permit Washington to deprive DeFunis of his final semester of
law school, the Court nevertheless ruled that DeFunis’s matriculation
rendered the lawsuit moot.338
This was a clear sign that the Supreme Court was not ready to adjudicate
affirmative action lawsuits.339 As Justice Douglass’s clerk wrote in a
331.
332.
333.
334.
335.
336.
337.
338.
339.

Id. at 177.
416 U.S. 312 (1974).
HOWARD BALL, THE BAKKE CASE: RACE, EDUCATION, & AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 22 (2000).
Id.
Id. at 23.
Id. at 27.
Id. at 31.
BALL, supra note 333, at 43-44.
Id. at 45.

https://digitalcommons.onu.edu/onu_law_review/vol48/iss1/4

36

Merriam: Beyond the Law: A Four-Step Explanation of Why AffirmativeAction

2021]

BEYOND THE LAW: A FOUR-STEP EXPLANATION

131

memorandum to his boss, there was a strong legal argument that DeFunis’s
claim was not moot because the “controversy will continue and is a recurring
one.”340 Therefore, the clerk claimed, if the Court dismissed his claim on
mootness grounds, “it would be fairly obvious that all the court is doing is
ducking the issue.”341 And this would signal to colleges and universities that
the Supreme Court tacitly approved of affirmative action.
This signal was especially important because the facts underlying the
DeFunis case represented an important trend in higher education. As
discussed in Part II.B, affirmative action in higher education began at Harvard
and then rapidly expanded to other elite institutions, including the rest of the
Ivies, several elite liberal arts colleges, and a few elite public universities.342
The University of Washington adopted its affirmative action program in
1968, following the lead of elite public institutions like Michigan, UCLA,
and Berkeley.343 At the time, Washington was not nearly as competitive or
prestigious as these schools.344 The person who initiated affirmative action
at Washington, President Charles Odegaard, seems to have brought
affirmative action to the University of Washington not simply as part of an
egalitarian commitment to racial equality, but as part of a larger effort to
transform the university into a national institution.345 Indeed, Odegaard is
credited for having transformed the University of Washington, upon
becoming president of the institution in 1959, by doing four things: increasing
student enrollment, adding new university buildings, producing research
grants, and introducing affirmative action.346 This has come to be known as
the “golden era in the history of the university,”347 with the Governor even
making the day of his retirement, May 11, 1973, “Charles E. Odegaard
Day.”348 The DeFunis case not only stands out for the Supreme Court’s
unwillingness to adjudicate the controversy, but also for what it signaled
about what it meant to be a national university after the civil rights
movement.349 Being an elite institution now required, in addition to all the
traditional indicia of academic prestige (such as modern facilities and
research scholars), an affirmative action program.

340. Id. at 31.
341. Id.
342. See supra Part II.B.
343. BALL, supra note 333, at 4.
344. Id. at 5-6.
345. Id.; Tom Griffin, Charles Odegaard, 1911-1999, was UW’s steady hand for 15 remarkable
years, U. OF WASH. MAG. (Mar. 2000), https://magazine.washington.edu/feature/charles-odegaard-19111999-was-uws-steady-hand-for-15-remarkable-years/.
346. Id.
347. Id.
348. 1970-1979, U. OF WASH., https://www.washington.edu/alumni/columns/june98/1970.html.
349. BALL, supra note 333, at 45.

Published by DigitalCommons@ONU,

37

Ohio Northern University Law Review, Vol. 48 [], Iss. 1, Art. 4

132

OHIO NORTHERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 48

This link between prestige and affirmative action was also expressed in
the amicus briefs filed in the DeFunis case. Supporting the state’s side were
22 amicus briefs, including “120 groups and individuals.”350 This included
the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Harvard University,
Harvard College, the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 70 law school
deans, the American Bar Association, the American Association of Law
Schools, the Law School Admissions Committee, the American Association
of Medical Colleges, and the NAACP.351 On the other side, there were only
six groups that filed amicus briefs in support of DeFunis.352 Three of these
groups represented Jewish interests (American Jewish Congress, the
Advocate Society, and the Anti-Defamation League), one represented union
interests (AFL-CIO), and two represented business interests (the U.S.
Chamber of Commerce and the National Association of Manufacturers).353
The contrast in the amicus filings could not have been clearer. The
national arsenals of powers, including the U.S. government, the most elite
academic institutions, and the leading professional associations, were all on
the side of affirmative action.354 DeFunis thus represented how much had
changed in the nation’s power relations as a result of the civil rights
movement.355 Affirmative action now had the sanction of both political
parties, the Supreme Court, and the nation’s elites.356 Over the next decade
it would spread throughout higher education, paving the way for Phase 4,
when affirmative action became reconceptualized as about diversity, a move
that has permitted affirmative action to broaden and strengthen despite
adverse judicial decisions, state referenda, and public opinion.357 The
Supreme Court’s decision in Bakke initiated this change.
PHASE FOUR: THE DIVERSITY TURN

IV.

The Bakke case involved a constitutional and statutory challenge to the
legality of the UC Davis Medical School admissions program, which
specifically reserved 16 out of 100 spots for “minority group” members,
explicitly identified as “blacks, Chicanos, Asians, American Indians.”358 A
divided Supreme Court held that this use of a strict numeric set-aside
amounted to a racial quota, in violation of the 14th Amendment’s Equal

350.
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352.
353.
354.
355.
356.
357.
358.

Id. at 34.
Id.
Id. at 35-36.
Id.
BALL, supra note 333, at 34.
Id. at 35.
Id.
Infra Part IV.
Bakke, 438 U.S. at 274.
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Protection Clause.359 In Justice Lewis Powell’s plurality opinion, Justice
Powell speculated that a more individualized system based on the value of
diversity would comply with the 14th Amendment.360 To illustrate this point,
Justice Powell cited Harvard College’s admissions program as a model.361
Justice Powell even included an extensive discussion of the Harvard
admissions program in his appendix, entitled the “Harvard College
Admissions Program.”362 Before we get to Justice Powell’s opinion, there
are some notable facts about the underlying lawsuit, relating to some of the
trends discussed earlier in the Article.
A. The Bakke Background Facts
One notable background fact about the underlying lawsuit is that UC
Davis was not at the time an established or prestigious institution.363 Allan
Bakke filed his lawsuit in 1974, only two years after UC Davis graduated its
first class; indeed, the medical school was created in 1966.364 Nevertheless,
one of the first things that this new medical school did was reserve a
significant number of spots for non-white medical students.365 This attests to
the point made in Part III.C, how affirmative action had become associated
with institutional prestige, thereby facilitating the spread of affirmative action
from elite institutions to less-competitive ones in the 1970s.366
A related point of interest is that the UC Davis affirmative action program
reflected the changing demographics of the country.367 As discussed in Parts
I-III, earlier phases of affirmative action had been structured around
increasing black representation in various professions.368 But as immigration
patterns began changing in the 1970s, owing in part to the 1965 Immigration
Act, it became increasingly clear that American race relations were not
entirely about the traditional black-white paradigm.369 The UC Davis
system—which reserved spots for “blacks, Chicanos, Asians, [and] American
Indians”370—signaled that, in this new America, affirmative action programs
would become more complicated, going beyond the politics of black-white
relations.
359. Id. at 318-20.
360. Id. at 318.
361. Id. at 316.
362. Appendix to Opinion of Powell, J. at 321, Bakke, 438 U.S. at 321.
363. BALL, supra note 333, at 49.
364. Id.
365. Id. at 49-50.
366. See supra Part III.C.
367. See supra Parts I-III.
368. Id.
369. Hist. Ed., U.S. Immigration Since 1965, HIST. (Mar. 5, 2010), https://www.history.com/topics/i
mmigration/us-immigration-since-1965.
370. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 274.
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A third point relates to Allan Bakke’s personal story. Allan Bakke
applied to medical school in his early 30s, after having served in the Marine
Corps and having worked as a NASA engineer.371 He had a strong GPA and
high MCAT scores, but because of his age, he was rejected from every
medical school to which he applied.372 Nevertheless, despite his age, Bakke
was a very strong candidate for the recently created UC Davis Medical
School, where Bakke’s numbers were well above average.373 Indeed,
Bakke’s overall MCAT score was 72 and his GPA was 3.44; by contrast, the
averages for the regular pool of UC Davis Medical admissions were 69 on
the MCAT and a 3.5 GPA, and the averages for the special affirmative action
pool were 33 on the MCAT and a 2.6 GPA.374
In May of 1973, however, Davis rejected Bakke, and Bakke subsequently
wrote a letter to the “Associate Dean and Chairman of the Admissions
Committee, protesting that the special admissions program operated as a
racial and ethnic quota.”375 When Bakke applied again in 1974, the associate
dean (the person to whom he had sent the letter) was among the six people
who interviewed him, and the interview involved “a discussion of the Davis
quota system.”376 This discussion in the interview may have been what led
to Bakke’s lawsuit, as “the dean gave Bakke the lowest score of any of the
interviewers and exercised his discretion not to place him on the waiting list,”
apparently as retribution for Bakke’s position on affirmative action.377
This is, again, evidence of how affirmative action related to shifting
power relations. Just a decade earlier, it would have been unthinkable that a
medical school applicant would be penalized by a dean for merely criticizing
affirmative action. But by the mid-1970s, affirmative action had become so
enmeshed with how academic institutions operated that an applicant’s
political view on affirmative action may have been the basis for denying
admission to a veteran with scores substantially above the school’s
average.378
371. BALL, supra note 333, at 46-47.
372. See id. at 52-54.
373. Id. at 46-47, 52.
374. Id. at 52.
375. Alan M. Dershowitz & Laura Hanft, Affirmative Action and the Harvard College DiversityDiscretion Model: Paradigm or Pretext, 1 CARDOZO L. REV. 379, 404 n. 86 (1979) (quoting Record at
259, Bakke, 438 U.S. at 265).
376. Id.
377. Id.
378. See S. J. Diamond, Where Are They Now?: A Drifter, A Deadbeat and an Intensely Private
Doctor. Hardly Heroes, These Are the Faces Behind Some of the Most Famous Legal Decisions in
America, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 30, 1992, 12:00 AM), https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1992-08-30vw-8207-story.html. After winning his lawsuit in the Supreme Court, Bakke was able to enter medical
school, at the age of 38, eventually becoming an anesthesiologist. He is now 80 years old and still refuses
to talk publicly about the lawsuit.
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When Allan Bakke’s case came before the Supreme Court, it was, as
mentioned in the Article Introduction, one of the most controversial cases
ever to come before the Court.379 It therefore may not come as a surprise that
Justice Powell later proclaimed it to be his most important opinion.380 What
may come as a surprise, however, is that it is also one of his most
misunderstood opinions.381 In particular, three misunderstandings of Justice
Powell’s opinion have prevented scholars from seeing how Bakke did not
simply uphold a certain type of affirmative action program.382 This opinion
helped change affirmative action into what it is today.383
B. Three Misunderstandings of Justice Powell’s Opinion
Scholars misinterpret Justice Powell’s opinion in three important ways.
Below, I will explain these misinterpretations and discuss how a correct
interpretation will help us more clearly understand the trajectory of
affirmative action law.
1. The Source of the Appendix
Scholars often treat Justice Powell’s Appendix A to the Bakke opinion as
though this were a formal document from the Harvard Admissions Office.
This conventional understanding is certainly understandable. After all, the
Appendix had an official-sounding title: “Harvard College Admissions
Program.” Moreover, Powell’s Appendix A read like a formal document,
even citing internal university reports and describing in detail how the
admissions committee operates.384 And, if one wanted to locate the source
for the Appendix to the Bakke opinion, one would find that it matched the
language appended to an amicus brief filed in Bakke by Harvard College
(joined by Columbia, Stanford, and University of Pennsylvania).385 Given
the content of Appendix A and that there was no indication of where the
information came from outside of that Harvard amicus brief, a natural reading
of the Appendix is that Justice Powell had simply appended a formal
university admissions document that Harvard included in its amicus brief. 386
While this conventional interpretation is reasonable, it is not correct. The
Appendix’s text originally comes not from an appendage of an amicus brief
379. See supra p. 1.
380. Linda Greenhouse, Powell: Moderation Amid Divisions, N.Y. TIMES (June 27, 1987), https://
www.nytimes.com/1987/06/27/us/powell-moderation-amid-divisions.html.
381. See infra Part IV.B.
382. Id.
383. See infra Part IV.B and Part IV.C.
384. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 321-22.
385. Appendix to Brief of Columbia Univ. et al. as Amici Curiae at 1-2, Bakke, 438 U.S. at 265 (No.
76-8110).
386. Id.
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but rather from the body of an amicus brief—namely, Archibald Cox’s
amicus brief for Harvard College in the DeFunis case, an amicus brief that is
not publicly available.387 Indeed, in his research on the Bakke Appendix,
Professor David B. Oppenheimer has found that Justice Powell merely took
Cox’s argument in DeFunis about the normative value of the Harvard College
admissions program and entered it as the Appendix to his Bakke opinion.388
The only change in the language was an update to Cox’s dating of the Harvard
affirmative action program to account for the five years between the DeFunis
and Bakke decisions.389 Professor Oppenheimer has thus come to the startling
conclusion that “the Bakke/Harvard appendix, which has become the standard
description of the diversity justification for affirmative action, is not an
official publication of the Harvard admissions office, but rather an advocate’s
description in an amicus curiae brief of how Harvard operates.”390
Oppenheimer has also discovered, through research of Justice Powell’s
notes in the DeFunis case, how it came to be that Justice Powell took text
from an amicus brief in DeFunis and entered it as Appendix A in the Bakke
case.391 When DeFunis was pending before the Court, Justice Powell’s clerk,
John C. Jeffries Jr., wrote a memo telling Powell to “pay particular attention
to the ‘brief by Archibald Cox for Harvard College.’”392 Justice Powell seems
to have followed his clerk’s advice, even adding a red check mark over Cox’s
name.393 Additionally, Professor Oppenheimer found in Justice Powell’s
DeFunis file two 1974 newspaper articles “describing and promoting the
diversity justification, specifically referencing and quoting the Cox/Harvard
brief.”394 The first article was a March 3, 1974 New York Times article by
Anthony Lewis395 and the other was a Newsweek article by Jerrold K.
Footlick.396
According to Oppenheimer, when the Bakke case was before the Court,
Justice Powell returned to the Cox amicus brief from DeFunis.397 Indeed, in
1977, when the Bakke case was before the Court, Justice Powell’s clerk, Bob
387. In fact, Professor Oppenheimer was able to make this startling discovery only because his
institution, Berkeley Law, had a reprinted version of the case and related briefs in a three-volume set.
Oppenheimer, supra note 181, at 170.
388. Id. at 171.
389. Compare Brief of the President and Fellows of Harvard College at 14, with Bakke, 438 U.S. at
321.
390. Oppenheimer, supra note 181, at 171.
391. Id. at 172-73.
392. Id. at 172.
393. Id.
394. Oppenheimer, supra note 181, at 172.
395. Lewis, supra note 8, at 5.
396. Jerrold K. Footlick, Justice: Racism in Reverse, NEWSWEEK, 1974, reprinted in Justice
Powell’s DeFunis archives at 68.
397. Oppenheimer, supra note 181, at 172.
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Comfort, wrote a memo on Bakke to Justice Powell, and in that letter,
Comfort repeatedly cited as authority the “Brief for Harvard College in
DeFunis.”398 Justice Powell added in the margin of the memorandum, “This
is the position that appeals to me. Use DeFunis.”399 By deciding to “use
DeFunis,” Justice Powell was clearly referring to the Cox amicus brief in
DeFunis, and not to the actual DeFunis opinion, which of course dismissed
the lawsuit on mootness grounds.400
Why is it significant that Appendix A was taken from the body of Cox’s
amicus brief? That relates to how scholars overstate the reliability of the
Appendix in describing how Harvard admissions operated at the time.
2. The Reliability of the Appendix
Scholars treat the Bakke Appendix as an accurate description of the
Harvard program, contra all the evidence provided supra in Part II.B.401
There are, of course, reasons to be suspicious of any piece of advocacy as
providing an objective description of facts.402 But Cox’s description of the
Harvard program is particularly unreliable. The Cox brief cited only two
authorities for how Harvard admissions operated—reports submitted in 1960
and 1968 by the outgoing admissions deans for the Harvard faculty.403 Here
is the relevant Bakke Appendix language:
For the past 30 years Harvard College has received each year
applications for admission that greatly exceed the number of places
in the freshman class. The number of applicants who are deemed to
be not “qualified” is comparatively small. The vast majority of
applicants demonstrate through test scores, high school records and
teachers’ recommendations that they have the academic ability to do
adequate work at Harvard, and perhaps to do it with distinction.
Faced with the dilemma of choosing among a large number of
“qualified” candidates, the Committee on Admissions could use the
single criterion of scholarly excellence and attempt to determine who
among the candidates were likely to perform best academically. But
for the past 30 years the Committee on Admissions has never adopted
this approach. The belief has been that if scholarly excellence were
the sole or even predominant criterion, Harvard College would lose
398.
399.
400.
401.
402.
403.

Id. at 173.
Id.
Id. at 172.
Compare Appendix to Opinion at 321-24, Bakke, 438 U.S. at 265 with supra Part II.B.
JEROME FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL 15-16 (3rd ed. 1973).
Appendix to Brief of Columbia Univ. et al. as Amici Curiae, supra note 390, at 1-2.
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a great deal of its vitality and intellectual excellence and that the
quality of the educational experience offered to all students would
suffer. Consequently, after selecting those students whose
intellectual potential will seem extraordinary to the faculty —perhaps
150 or so out of an entering class of over 1,100 the Committee seeks
variety in making its choices. This has seemed important . . . in part
because it adds a critical ingredient to the effectiveness of the
educational experience [in Harvard College] . . . The effectiveness of
our students’ educational experience has seemed to the Committee to
be affected as importantly by a wide variety of interests, talents,
backgrounds and career goals as it is by a flue faculty and our
libraries, laboratories and housing arrangements.404
Justice Powell cited two Harvard documents, and these internal reports
had absolutely nothing to do with race and its relationship to academic
diversity. These reports do, to be clear, discuss the value of academic
diversity, but they tell us nothing about how race relates to academic
diversity.
One of these Harvard documents, a 1960 report by Dean Bender,
identifies various types of diversity that Harvard was seeking to create:
A Harvard College with a certain range and mixture and diversity in
its student body – a college with some snobs and some Scandinavian
farm boys who skate beautifully and some bright Bronx premeds,
with some students who care passionately if unwisely (but who knew
about editing the Crimson or beating Yale), or who have ambition to
run a business and make a million, or to [be] elected to public
office.405
The 1960 report certainly suggests Harvard would benefit from a
diversity of professional interests, including students interested in medicine,
business, and politics, but it says nothing about the benefit of racial
diversity.406 In fact, the only reference to ethnicity is to Scandinavian hockey
players.407 Perhaps the reference to “Bronx premeds” was an indirect

404. Id. (quoting Fred L. Glimp, Final Report to the Faculty of Arts and Sciences, 65 Official Reg.
Harv. U. No. 25, 93, 104-105 (1968)).
405. Ex-Dean Bender’s Valedictory Message, Harv. Crimson (Oct. 2, 1961), https://www.thecrimso
n.com/article/1961/10/2/ex-dean-benders-valedictory-message-pexcerpts-from/?page=2.
406. Id.
407. Id.
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reference to Jewish pre-med students.408 Otherwise, there is nothing about
ethnicity or race in that statement.409
The second document, a 1968 report by Dean Glimp, also mentioned
diversity without explicitly discussing race.410 In that report, Dean Glimp
discusses socio-economic diversity and its relationship to academic
credentials:
It became clear to the Committee that students representing some of
the most important elements of Harvard’s socio-economic
diversity— students whom the admission staff and our alumni
schools committeemen were working hard to recruit— would be cut
out disproportionately with much of a further narrowing of the range
of measured ability.411
Here, Dean Glimp identified different types of students who would be
affected by strict academic requirements: “students from seriously
disadvantaged backgrounds, from rural areas, and from blue-collar
families.”412 The reference to “disadvantaged backgrounds” may have been
an indirect reference to black students but the report does not explicitly
mention race.413
That Cox limited his citations to these two Harvard College authorities
that do not explicitly discuss how Harvard’s affirmative action program was
operating is especially surprising given that Harvard had a very developed
system of racial preferences at this point.414 As discussed in Part II.B,
Harvard led the development of affirmative action in higher education in the
1950s and 60s,415 and by the time of the 1968 Dean Glimp report, Harvard
had in place a roughly 200 SAT preference for black applicants.416
Additionally, by the time of the Bakke brief, Harvard had what appeared to
be a rigid quota in place, having yielded the exact same percentage of black
students (seven) for eight of the last nine years (the only exception is that the
1976 class was eight percent black).417 But there is nothing in the Cox
DeFunis brief, or in the Powell Bakke opinion, about how Harvard’s
408. Id.
409. Id.
410. Glimp, supra note 405, at 114-15.
411. Id. at 105-06.
412. Id. at 106.
413. Id. at 106.
414. KARABEL, supra note 178, at 379.
415. See supra Part II.B.
416. KARABEL, supra note 178, at 404.
417. Dershowitz & Hanft, supra note 375, at 383 n.13. It is notable that the jump to seven percent
was in the 1969 class, which, as discussed previously, is when Harvard formally agreed to try to satisfy
the BSAY’s demand for the twelve percent quota. See KARABEL, supra note 178, at 390-91.
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affirmative action program consisted of a roughly 200 SAT point preference
and a seven percent racial quota.
Despite Cox’s inaccurate portrayal of Harvard College admissions in his
amicus brief, Justice Powell apparently treated it as though it were a reliable
and quasi-official Harvard document, merely describing the ins and outs of
the college’s admissions operations.418 Justice Powell’s reliance on the Cox
amicus brief is particularly significant in terms of what it teaches us about the
most famous part of the Bakke Appendix: the statement that, under the model
Harvard admissions program, race matters in the same way as region.
Here is the relevant language from the Bakke Appendix:
When the Committee on Admissions reviews the large middle group
of applicants who are ‘admissible’ and deemed capable of doing
good work in their courses, the race of an applicant may tip the
balance in his favor just as geographic origin or a life spent on a farm
may tip the balance in other candidates’ cases. A farm boy from
Idaho can bring something to Harvard College that a Bostonian
cannot offer. Similarly, a black student can usually bring something
that a white person cannot offer.419
Professor Oppenheimer has discovered from Justice Powell’s archives
that this analogy between race and region played a critical role in Justice
Powell’s decision-making. Indeed, his clerk’s Bakke “memo extensively
discusse[d] the diversity rationale for race-conscious affirmative action,
repeatedly cite[d] as authority the ‘Brief for Harvard College in DeFunis,’
and refer[red] to the ‘Idaho farm boy’ analogy.”420 According to Professor
Oppenheimer, Justice Powell even intended in the Bakke oral argument to ask
Cox, who argued on behalf of UC Davis, “how Harvard went about choosing
an Idaho farm boy over a Boston first-family son, and whether there was a
guarantee of a certain number of seats for farm boys.”421 Unfortunately,
Justice Powell “didn’t get to the question before time ran out.”422
This would have been an excellent question for Justice Powell to ask, for
we know that there was no comparable program at Harvard for Idaho farm
boys, or for rural applicants in general.423 Indeed, there was no formal
recruitment program for rural applicants and seemingly no admissions
preference whatsoever for rural applicants. Cox’s analogy between black
418. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 316-17.
419. Id. at 316 (quoting Appendix to Brief of Columbia Univ. et al. as Amici Curiae at 1-2, Bakke,
438 U.S. at 265 (No. 76-811)).
420. Oppenheimer, supra note 181, at 173.
421. Id. at 180.
422. Id.
423. Dershowitz & Hanft, supra note 375, at 399-400.
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students and “Idaho farm boys” was a lawyer’s argument about how to justify
racial preferences as part of a holistic, individualized interest in academic
diversity. It was not a factual description of how the Harvard affirmative
action program actually operated.
Nevertheless, a lasting legacy of the Bakke case is that Cox’s normative
analogy is treated as a factual description. In Oppenheimer’s words, “Justice
Powell’s quotation of that line in his Bakke opinion would become one of the
most widely recognized quotes about affirmative action in the decades of
debates that followed.”424 Over 40 years of affirmative action law have been
shaped by an advocate’s analogy with little to no basis in how Harvard’s
admissions program actually operated.
3. The Ideological Orientation of Justice Powell’s Opinion
Scholars often treat Justice Powell’s opinion as a centrist or middleground position, a sort of compromise between liberal permissiveness toward
affirmative action and conservative hostility toward affirmative action.425
This conventional understanding of Justice Powell’s opinion is certainly
understandable. Justice Powell was, after all, the swing Justice at the time.426
And his Bakke opinion was, moreover, a concurring opinion, siding with a
conservative block that wanted to reject all forms of affirmative action, but
reasoning in a way that offered some room for liberals to uphold future
affirmative action programs.427 Indeed, the opinion explicitly permitted what
seemed like a narrower and more racially neutral form of affirmative action
than the quotas at issue in the case.428 Under Powell’s reasoning, then, it
would seem that the only affirmative action measures that would survive
would be those that truly considered race to be just as significant as factors
like region, class, religiosity, and political perspective.429
But that of course is not what happened. Affirmative action became
exactly what Alan Dershowitz predicted it would become, in his article
written just a year after Bakke. Indeed, as Dershowitz predicted, the
“diversity-discretion model” endorsed in Justice Powell’s concurrence would
have the effect of legitimizing “an admissions process that is inherently
capable of gross abuse and that . . . has in fact been deliberately manipulated
424. Oppenheimer, supra note 181, at 171.
425. See, e.g., Mark Tushnet, Justice Lewis F. Powell and the Jurisprudence of Centrism, 93 Mich.
L. Rev. 1854 (1995).
426. Al Kamen, Justice Powell Resigns, Was Supreme Court’s Pivotal Vote, Wash. Post, June 27,
1987, at A01.
427. Adam Harris, How Lewis Powell Changed Affirmative Action, THE ATL.: EDUC. (Oct. 13,
2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/education/archive/2018/10/how-lewis-powell-changed-affirmative-a
ction/572938/.
428. Id.
429. Id.
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for the specific purpose of perpetuating religious and ethnic discrimination in
college admissions.”430 Indeed, as will be discussed below, the Bakke
“diversity-discretion model” has allowed affirmative action to expand even
beyond what explicit quotas would have permitted, because under the
“diversity-discretion model,” universities have been able to shield their
practices from public and judicial scrutiny.431 Far from being a “middleground” opinion, Justice Powell’s diversity rationale provided exactly what
affirmative action programs would need to expand in the face of increased
criticism in the coming decades.432
C. The Legacy of Bakke: From Grutter to Fisher
Even in the decades after Bakke, many schools stuck to rigid points
systems, whereby certain racial groups were given additional points to
account for group performance differences on standardized tests.433 Many
colleges prefer these points systems over individualized systems because they
are much easier and cheaper to operate.434 The University of Michigan cases
brought this issue to the forefront, with the undergraduate case using a rigid
points system,435 and the law school using a system that looked much more
like the Harvard “diversity-discretion model.”436 The result of what the
different admissions systems produced was almost exactly the same, in that
in any given year both systems awarded black applicants a roughly standard
deviation preference on the relevant standardized tests,437 but the methods
looked different, in that the undergraduate system had a formal policy of
awarding a certain number of points, and the law school system had a more
individualized system, something the law school admissions process could
handle given the fact that it was dealing with a much smaller pool of
applicants.438 Justice O’Connor, citing the Bakke opinion as controlling
precedent, upheld the law school program but invalidated the undergraduate
one.439 After these decisions, it was clear that the “diversity-discretion
model” was the only game in town.440

430. Dershowitz & Hanft, supra note 375, at 385.
431. See infra Part IV.C.
432. Oppenheimer, supra note 181, at 198-99.
433. See, e.g., Gratz, 539 U.S. at 244.
434. LUMINA FOUND. & CENTURY FOUND., THE FUTURE OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 22 (Richard D.
Kalenbert ed., 2014).
435. Gratz, 539 U.S. at 254-55.
436. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 314.
437. Gratz, 539 U.S. at 298 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
438. Compare id. at 254-55 (majority opinion) with Grutter, 539 U.S. at 314.
439. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 343; Gratz, 539 U.S. at 276-77 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
440. Oppenheimer, supra note 181, at 202.
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After Grutter, affirmative action became all about diversity.441 As
universities and human resources departments across the country adopted the
term, it began even to enter public discourse.442 This is illustrated poignantly
in President George W. Bush’s statement following the decision.443 President
Bush applauded the decision on the ground that it struck a “careful balance
between the goal of campus diversity and the fundamental principle of equal
treatment under the law,” and he proclaimed that “diversity is one of
America’s greatest strengths.”444 This was a striking statement in 2003, but
within the next 15 years, it would become commonplace to say that “diversity
is our greatest strength,” 445 even in the face of tragedy.446
During this period, affirmative action preferences strengthened even
beyond the 200-point preferences that the Big Three adopted in the 1960s.
Indeed, according to an extensive study of affirmative action by Thomas J.
Espenshade and Alexandria Walton Radford, in 1997 black applicants to
private colleges had a 310 SAT advantage over white applicants – meaning
that “[a] black candidate with an SAT score of 1250 could be expected to
have the same chance of being admitted as a white student whose SAT score
is 1560, all other things equal.”447 Other studies of other cateogires of higher

441. Id. at 201.
442. See Frederick R. Lynch, The Diversity Machine: The Drive to Change the “White Male
Workplace” (2005).
443. See Statement on the Supreme Court Decision on the Michigan Affirmative Action Cases, 1
Pub. Papers 676-677 (June 23, 2003).
444. Id.
445. For example, in his 2016 speech on the 15th anniversary of the 9/11 attacks, former President
Obama proclaimed: “We know that our diversity, our patchwork heritage is not a weakness, it is still and
always will be one of our greatest strengths.” Kevin Freking, Obama Calls on Americans to Embrace
Diversity on 9/11, PBS: NEWSHOUR WEEKEND (Sept. 11, 2016, 9:03 AM), https://www.pbs.org/newshour
/nation/pentagon-watch-live-911-obama. In April 2016, Hillary Clinton, speaking to Al Sharpton’s
National Action Network, told the crowd: “We know our diversity is a strength, not a weakness.”
Postmaster, Clinton Calls on NAN, MANHATTAN TIMES (Apr. 14, 2016), https://www.manhattantimesnew
s.com/clinton-calls-on-nan/. Likewise, in Bernie Sanders’ speech at the 2016 Democratic National
Convention, endorsing Hillary Clinton as the democratic presidential nominee, Sanders asserted: “Hillary
Clinton understands that our diversity is one of our greatest strengths.” READ: Bernie Sanders’ Speech at
the Democratic Convention, NPR: POLITICS (July 25, 2016, 10:42 PM), https://www.npr.org/2016/07/25/4
87426056/read-bernie-sanders-prepared-remarks-at-the-dnc.
446. One of the more notable examples arose in the wake of the Fort Hood massacre, the deadliest
mass shooting on an American military base. After Nidal Hasan shot and killed 13 people, injuring more
than 30 others, the Army Chief of Staff, General George W. Casey Jr., proclaimed: “Our diversity, not
only in our Army, but in our country, is a strength.” Casey went on to assert that the nation’s diversity was
even more important than these murders: “And as horrific as this tragedy was, if our diversity becomes a
casualty, I think that’s worse.” Will Dunham, Army Chief Fears Backlash for Muslim U.S. Soldiers,
REUTERS: U.S. NEWS (Nov. 8, 2009, 11:38 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-texas-shootingcasey/army-chief-fears-backlash-for-muslim-u-s-soldiers-idUSTRE5A71AJ20091108.
447. Thomas J. Espenshade & Alexandria Walton Radford, No Longer Separate, Not Yet Equal:
Race and Class in Elite College Admission and Campus Life 93 (2009).
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education and in different application years have found similar SAT
preferences.448
By the time the Fisher case came to the Supreme Court, affirmative
action had been a part of federal policy and university admissions for over
two generations, and during this time, affirmative action had not only spread
through American corporate, academic, and public affairs, but it had
strengthened over that time. It was therefore of no significance that the Texas
program challenged in Fisher had the effect of preferring black applicants
from private high schools over Hispanic applicants from public schools,.449
Nor did it matter that, in the first round of Fisher, what has come to be known
as Fisher I, the Supreme Court vacated the Fifth Circuit’s decision and
remanded the case back to the Fifth Circuit, with the order to apply strict
scrutiny consistent with the Supreme Court’s precedents.450 By the time the
case came back to the Supreme Court, in 2016, after the Fifth Circuit applied
a mild version of strict scrutiny that deferred to university discretion, it was
clear that the Supreme Court would affirm the Fifth Circuit’s weakened
version of strict scrutiny.451
What this signaled, of course, was that while strict scrutiny would still
apply in form, universities would in effect have free reign under the
“diversity-discretion model” developed in Bakke.452 Fisher is the last
affirmative action to come before the Supreme Court, and the last five years
of silence substantiate the unwritten rule of affirmative action law: No matter
what the public thinks, what laws are passed, and what the Supreme Court
says, affirmative action is here to stay.
CONCLUSION
This Article has demonstrated how affirmative action has changed over
the last 75 years – from a post hoc administrative tool for eliminating
discrimination in public employment, to a proactive Great Society program
for the achievement of proportionate representation in limited areas of
academic and professional life, to a judicially enforceable bipartisan tool for
economic and social reform, and finally to a program designed to diversify a
wide range of American public and private affairs.453 These four phases have
served to secure the place of affirmative action in American law and politics.
Three recent changes suggest that we may be entering a fifth phase, putting
affirmative action even further beyond the reach of public scrutiny.
448. See id. at 93 n. 30.
449. Id. at 305-06.
450. Fisher, 570 U.S. at 314-15 (majority opinion).
451. Fisher, 136 S.Ct. at 2214-15.
452. Oppenheimer, supra note 181, at 201-02.
453. See supra Parts I-IV.
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One change has to do with how American higher education operates –
namely, how university administrators increasingly see their function to be
enmeshed with a diversity mission.454 Consider a fascinating article by
Professor Lauren Foley, based on her interviews of University of Michigan
administrators after the state had passed a constitutional referendum banning
affirmative action.455 Foley found that University of Michigan administrators
were not seeking to defy the Michigan ban; in fact, they expressed a desire to
comply with it.456 But they used the Bakke diversity rationale as the basis for
getting around what appeared to be an unambiguous ban on affirmative action
practices.457
Even more interestingly, Professor Foley found that the Michigan
administrators interpreted racial diversity as defining the purpose of the
University of Michigan admissions system and even defining their own
professional identities. One admissions administrator proclaimed, for
example, that the University of Michigan’s mission to racial diversity is “way
beyond the law”458 and is “way beyond everything that anyone can put on
us.”459 Racial diversity was even proclaimed to be the very identity of the
college: “It’s part of us. It’s what this place was built on. If you don’t believe
in that you shouldn’t be here.”460 Another administrator reported that you
become an admissions person at Michigan “not just to do a job,” but “because
you believe in the institution’s mission [of prioritizing racial diversity].”461
According to another administrator, “[t]he value of diversity was ‘hardwired
in the mind.”462 Professor Foley observed how “[a]dministrators spoke of
their commitment [to racial diversity] with existential conviction,” even
proclaiming, almost religiously, that diversity issues “are part of my
being.”463 The recent conflicts on American campuses strongly suggest that
Michigan is not an outlier here.464 There is a national trend of higher
education administrators seeing their jobs as part of a larger racial mission.465

454. See Eugene T. Parker, Chief Diversity Officers Play a Vital Role If Appropriately Positioned
and Supported, Inside Higher Ed (Aug. 20, 2020, 3:00 AM), https://www.insidehighered.com/print/views/
2020/08/20/chief-diversity-officers-play-vital-role-if-appropriately-positioned-and-supported.
455. See generally Lauren S. Foley, By Other Means: The Continuation of Affirmative Action Policy
at the University of Michigan, 80 STUD. L., POL., & SOC’Y 3 (2019).
456. Id. at 15.
457. Id.
458. Id. at 14.
459. Id.
460. Foley, supra note 455, at 14-15.
461. Id. at 14.
462. Id. at 15.
463. Id. at 15.
464. Id. at 22.
465. Parker, supra note 454.
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A second trend, indicating that we are entering a new phase of affirmative
action, is that diversity is decreasingly defended as a policy or educational
tool, subject to empirical inquiry. It is instead asserted as a categorical moral
value, one that transcends empirical inquiry. We can see evidence of that in
the quasi-religious content of some of the quotes collected in Professor
Foley’s interviews.466 This view of diversity as a moral value is in sharp
contrast with the Bakke reasoning, which defended affirmative action as the
most effective way to promote diversity and defended diversity as an
empirically defensible way of providing various educational and professional
services.467 In the 21st century, by contrast, diversity has come to be a vision
of the American identity itself—a vision that defines the very purpose of why
governmental, educational, and corporate institutions exist in the first place.
Affirmative action is thus becoming valuable not so much as a policy tool
that could be tested through empirical study (in terms, for example, of
whether admitting more black medical students leads to better health-care
services provided in black communities) but as a moral value that transcends
empirical testing.468
A third and related trend is that, as diversity has become unmoored from
empirical inquiry, affirmative action has become unmoored from notions of
proportional representation. In the Bakke diversity phase, a critical question
was how much diversity affirmative action produced and what kind of
diversity it produced.469 Indeed, as discussed in Part IV, Justice Powell
seemed genuinely interested in Bakke to learn how Harvard recruited “Idaho
farm boys.”470 While the Cox brief was surely not being forthcoming with
the Court in suggesting that a comparison could be made between Harvard’s
race-based affirmative action program and its desire for regional and class
diversity, there was at least some truth in this analogy, in the sense that it was
almost certainly the case that Harvard did care about regional diversity to
some extent.471 To be sure, Harvard did not care enough about rural
representation to create a 200 SAT point difference between rural and nonrural applicants, or to create specific recruitment programs for rural students,
or even to collect data about the number of rural students attending the
college. But it was almost certainly true, at least in the abstract, that Cox was
right that Harvard administrators viewed rural students as part of the diversity
equation,472 because it was widely accepted at the time that any factor that
466. Foley, supra note 455, at 14-15.
467. Bakke, 418 U.S. at 311-12.
468. Richard Sander, A Collective Path Upward, in THE FUTURE OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 215-16
(Richard D. Kahlenberg ed., 2014).
469. Harris, supra note 428.
470. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 323.
471. Appendix to Brief of Columbia Univ. et al. as Amici Curiae, supra note 390, at 2-3.
472. Id.
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facilitated the free exchange of information, so as to broaden the
epistemological framework of an academic institution, was valuable.473
That is no longer the way that affirmative action discourse works,
suggesting that we are entering, or perhaps already have entered, a new phase
of affirmative action, one that is more interested in race as such than the
concept of diversity. Ironically, Harvard, the very institution that Justice
Powell used as the basis for initiating Phase 4 affirmative action, is a good
illustration of how affirmative action works in this fifth phase.474
Consider a 2015 Harvard Crimson article, revealing that Harvard has
strikingly few rural students, to the point that these few students are made to
feel like outsiders and are regularly derided as being backwards.475 In fact,
not only does Harvard admit only a few rural students, but a Crimson study
found a stilted regional representation altogether: “of the Class of 2017, fewer
than 12 percent of respondents identified as coming from Georgia and the rest
of the Southeast region, while 41.1 percent of students called the Northeast
home.”476 Nevertheless, despite this lack of geographic proportionality,
“[t]he College’s Admissions Office does not have plans to create
proportioned quotas for states or geographic regions.”477 Likewise, a survey
of Harvard’s Class of 2022 students found that “64 percent of survey takers
identified as Democrats,” and “just 11 percent reported being
Republicans.”478
Contrast these findings with recent data on Harvard’s racial
demographics. The ongoing Harvard litigation has showed that, under
Harvard’s affirmative action program, white students constituted only 37.61
percent of the admitted students and black students constituted 15.81 percent
of the admitted students.479 Given that whites currently constitute roughly 60
percent of the American population overall, and blacks constitute roughly 13
percent,480 that means that whites are now the most underrepresented racial
group at Harvard (in terms of national numbers) and blacks are now an
473. Id. at 2.
474. Alexandra A. Chaidez & Samuel W. Zwickel, Class of 2022 by the Numbers, The Harv.
Crimson, https://features.thecrimson.com/2018/freshman-survey/makeup-narrative/.
475. C. Ramsey Fahs & Forrest K. Lewis, Beyond Boston: Regional Diversity at Harvard, The Harv.
Crimson (Mar. 26, 2015), https://www.thecrimson.com/article/2015/3/26/regional-diversity-scrutiny/.
476. Id.
477. Id.
478. Shera S. Avi-Yonah & Delano R. Franklin, The Class of 2022 by the Numbers, THE HARV.
CRIMSON, https://features.thecrimson.com/2018/freshman-survey/lifestyle-narrative/.
479. Rebuttal Expert Report of Peter S. Arcidiacono at 110, Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v.
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overrepresented group (in terms of national numbers). The Harvard litigation
illustrates how affirmative action is no longer about diversity as such or even
proportional representation of various ethnic groups. Affirmative action is
now, at a fundamental level, about constructing a particular vision of
American race relations.
That brings us back to the original question presented in the Introduction:
How has affirmative action managed to be the only program in American law
that has strengthened and broadened outside the sanction of public opinion,
the federal judiciary, and state law? The answer lies in how courts and
political officials have adapted its applications and justifications to changing
racial conflicts. Affirmative action is thus best understood not as a short-term
measure for redressing past injustices but as a critical tool for managing
America’s most intractable problem—its race problem.
Through the different phases, affirmative action has become enmeshed
in how business, governmental, and academic institutions operate, making it
increasingly likely that in the coming decades affirmative action will face
resistance only at the margins. That is not to say that we will not continue to
see public resistance against affirmative action. And that is not to say that
courts will not continue to condemn affirmative action and perhaps even
strike down some programs. But it to say that affirmative action has become
so deeply embedded in elite institutional practices and cultural values that
any significant resistance will be in form and not in substance.
This is a testament to both judicial power and its limits. As discussed in
Part III, courts played a critical role in entrenching affirmative action, and as
discussed in Part IV, courts played a central role in shifting affirmative action
to become focused on diversity. But once affirmative action became
entrenched in American law and politics, and diversity became its defining
rationale, courts lost the power to control its trajectory. Affirmative action
discourse has thus become unmoored from the Bakke opinion itself. In this
new system, in which racial diversity has become a moral value that not only
transcends empirical inquiry but also defines how many institutions and
administrators operate, it is almost unthinkable as an intellectual matter, and
perhaps even impossible as a practical matter, that courts can suddenly put
the brakes on affirmative action.
So while there is much uncertainty over how affirmative action will
change in the coming years, including how the fifth phase will develop and
how the Harvard case will eventually be resolved, the fact that racial diversity
now constitutes the American ethos tells us more than any particular Supreme
Court case can tell us about the future of affirmative action. In other words,
so long as racial diversity is held to be at the very core of the American
identity, it does not matter what happens in the Harvard case – whatever the
Supreme Court decides, affirmative action is here to stay.
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